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Preface
Text analytics technologies are being widely used as components in Big Data applications, allowing
for the extraction of different types of information from large volumes of text, including purely factual
information (“traditional” text mining), subjective information (sentiment mining) and even metadata
(e.g. author profiling). A growing number of research efforts is now investigating the applicability of
these techniques for cybersecurity purposes. Many applications are using text analytics techniques to
provide a safer and more pleasant online experience, by detecting unwanted content and behavior on
the Internet. Other text analytics approaches attempt to detect illegal activity on online networks or
monitor social media against the background of real-life threats.
The second run of the workshop on Text Analytics for Cybersecurity and Online Safety (TA-COS
2018) aims to bring together researchers that have an active interest in the development and application
of text analytics systems in the broad context of cybersecurity. We were interested in research papers
on text analytics and text mining approaches that (1) help reduce the exposure to harmful content on
the Internet, (2) detect illegal online activities and (3) monitor user-generated content in the context of
real-life security threats.
Following our call for papers, we received papers on a wide range of topics and with the help of our
varied team of reviewers were able to select the most relevant and most interesting contributions. We
are very pleased to present a wide variety of topics of the accepted papers for the workshop. Two papers
deal with identifying hate speech on social media: Sirihattasak et al. present an annotated corpus and
classification experiments for toxic messages in Thai tweets, while Isbister et al. present a case study
on monitoring targeted hate in Swedisch online text. Alshehri et al. present a dataset of adult content
in Arabic Twitter and provide an in-depth analyses of this data. The fourth paper deals with targeted
email attacks. Das and Verma propose a system for advanced email masquerading attacks using Natural
Language Generation techniques. We are furthermore very pleased to be able to kick off our workshop
with a keynote lecture by Pierre Lison, who is a Senior Research Scientist at Norsk Regnesentral
(Norwegian Computing Center), a contract-funded research institute located in Oslo, Norway. He will
present research on data-driven models of reputation in cyber-security.
We are sure that the presentations at TA-COS 2018 will trigger fruitful discussions and will help foster
the awareness of the increasingly important role text analytics can play in cybersecurity applications.
Els Lefever, Bart Desmet, Guy De Pauw May 2018
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Annotation and Classification of Toxicity for Thai Twitter
Sugan Sirihattasak, Mamoru Komachi, Hiroshi Ishikawa
Tokyo Metropolitan University
6-6 Asahigaoka, Hino, Tokyo 191-0065, Japan
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Abstract
In this study, we present toxicity annotation for a Thai Twitter Corpus as a preliminary exploration for toxicity analysis in the Thai
language. We construct a Thai toxic word dictionary and select 3,300 tweets for annotation using the 44 keywords from our dictionary.
We obtained 2,027 and 1,273 toxic and non-toxic tweets, respectively; these were labeled by three annotators. The result of corpus
analysis indicates that tweets that include toxic words are not always toxic. Further, it is more likely that a tweet is toxic, if it contains
toxic words indicating their original meaning. Moreover, disagreements in annotation are primarily because of sarcasm, unclear existing
target, and word sense ambiguity. Finally, we conducted supervised classification using our corpus as a dataset and obtained an accuracy
of 0.80, which is comparable with the inter-annotator agreement of this dataset. Our dataset is available on GitHub.
Keywords: toxicity, corpus, Thai, Twitter
1. Introduction
With the rise of social media in Thailand, it has become
an integral part of the daily lives of Thai people, providing
various opportunities for education, relationships, and ca-
reer development. Despite these benefits, online toxicity is
not only becoming harsher, but also difficult to control. Fur-
thermore, the victims of toxic messages are not always the
intended targets of those messages. According to Wang et
al. (2011), many people regret their negative posts because
of problems they face later, such as being terminated from
employment and losing other opportunities. The instances
of bullying or any similar toxic behavior are not easy to
delete once they are posted publicly. In particular, any post
shared on social media can potentially spread widely across
an entire community with a considerably small possibility
of deleting it and undoing its effects.
Consequently, there have been many research efforts
among various fields such as social science, psychology,
and natural language processing, to improve the quality of
online conversion while considering the right to freedom of
speech. For example, the Google Jigsaw Team launched
the Perspective API1 to identify toxic comments.
Figure 1: Example of toxicity evaluation from Perspective
API.
One of the challenges in studying toxicity in online commu-
nication is a clear common definition of toxicity in the case
of language. Toxic comments are often sarcastic and in-
dicate aggressive disagreement; in Kolhatkar and Taboada
(2017), the relationship between constructiveness and tox-
icity including toxicity levels in news comments was stud-
ied. In our study, we define toxicity with a more general
perspective to include any messages that can imply toxic
1http://www.perspectiveapi.com/
behavior (Kwak and Blackburn, 2014), antisocial behav-
ior (Cheng et al., 2017), online harassment (Yin et al.,
2009), hate speech (Davidson et al., 2017), cyberbullying
(Van Hee et al., 2015), and any type of offensive language
(Razavi et al., 2010). In particular, a toxic message is any
message that may hurt or harm an individual or a general-
ized group, may challenge the societal norms, or negatively
affect the entire community. In terms of toxic words, we
consider any negative words, such as those associated with
profanity and obscenity, or those which are offensive.
Though there is an increase in the studies related to toxic-
ity, open resources related to it are still limited. There are
several corpora for major languages like English, including
a harassment dataset (Kennedy et al., 2017), hate speech
Twitter annotation corpus (Waseem and Hovy, 2016), and
personal attacks comment corpus (Wulczyn et al., 2017).
Unfortunately, researches related to this topic do not in-
clude minor languages, such as the Thai language. To our
best knowledge, there is no public Thai resource related to
online toxicity. Furthermore, text analysis in Thai language
is complicated due to ambiguity in segmentation (Cooper,
1996); for example, “ปลาตากลมตัวนี้น่ารัก (This round-eyes
(ตา | กลม) fish is cute.)” and “ขอเดินออกไปตากลม (Let
me go out to have some fresh air (ตาก | ลม) ).” Like-
wise, sentence boundary detection is difficult (Zhou et al.,
2016) because the space which is used for differentiating
sentences is not appropriate in some cases such as in “โอ๊ย!
เจ็บ (Ouch! it hurts).”
Some toxic tweets that are typical in the case of bully-
ing messages, such as “ไอ้ห่า! ไปตายซะ คนไร้ประโยชน์
แกก็เหมือนพ่อแก” (Damn you! Just go to die. You are use-
less just like your father.), may not only affect an individual,
but also his or her family. Thus, we present annotation and
classification of toxicity on Twitter in the Thai language as
a preliminary exploration for toxicity analysis in the Thai
language in general. The main contributions of this study
are as follows:
1. We construct a dictionary of Thai toxic words that we
use as keywords for annotation.
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2. We build a toxicity corpus based on Twitter messages
or tweets, because these messages represent the daily-
life conversations of the Thai people.
3. We used our abovementioned dataset to conduct su-
pervised classification and obtained an accuracy of
0.80 for it.
Our dictionary and corpus are available on GitHub2.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section
2 introduces the definition of toxicity and describes some
difficulties with respect to Thai tweet analysis. Section
3 explains our corpus construction and annotation process
including the construction of our dictionary of Thai toxic
words. Then, Section 4 presents the analysis of the result-
ing corpus, while Section 5 provides classification results
and discussion. Finally, Section 6 presents the conclusions
of our study and indicates future work.
2. Toxicity and Thai Language
Many social media platforms and websites use embedded
keyword-based approaches to automatically filter out toxic
messages. However, it is possible for individuals who are
close friends to casually communicate using toxic words
without intending any harm (Nand et al., 2016). Likewise,
the factors used to identify politeness in Thai male conver-
sation depend on the situational context such as the rela-
tionship between the speaker and listener, and the location
at which the conversation takes place, rather than the lin-
guistic aspects (Mekthawornwathana, 2011).
Moreover, the keyword-based approach does not seem flex-
ible for a non-segmenting language like the Thai language.
The following two examples contain a toxic word “หอก3”
(The original meaning is “spear”; however, the slang mean-
ing is an insulting phrase, “Damn, Bitch.”)
(a) นักการเมืองหอกเลวมากสมควรตาย
นักการเมือง (politician) | หอก (damn) | เลว (bad) |
มาก (very) | สมควร (deserve) | ตาย (die)
The damn Politician deserves to die.
(This is a toxic message.)
(b) ที่หอกล้องวงจรปิดเยอะจึงไม่มีหัวขโมย
ที่ (at) | หอ (dormitory) | กล้องวงจรปิด (security
camera) | เยอะ (many) | จึง (therefore) | ไม่ (no) |
มี (have) | หัวขโมย (thief/thieves)
There are no thieves because there are a lot of security
cameras at the dormitory.
(This is a non-toxic message.)
Therefore, not only ambiguity in segmenting as shown
above, but also word variations and homonyms are in-
evitable obstacles in Thai tweet analysis. For example,
2https://github.com/tmu-nlp/
ThaiToxicityTweetCorpus/
3This paper contains several inappropriate, impolite, and harsh
words in both the Thai and English languages. We rewrite some
English toxic words using “*” for some characters or replacing
these words with appropriate substitutes. However, we could not
rewrite such words for the Thai language because that may lead to
an ambiguous word.
the toxic word “เหี้ย” has several homonyms including the
following examples presented below.
(a) นักกีฬาประเทศนี้เหี้ยโกงตลอด
นักกีฬา (athlete) | ประเทศ (country) | นี้ (this) |
เหี้ย (damn/bad) | โกง (cheat) | ตลอด (always)
An athlete from this country always cheats.
(This is a toxic message.)
(b) อากาศร้อนเหี้ย
อากาศ (weather) | ร้อน (hot) | เหี้ย (damn/very)
The weather is very hot.
(This is a non-toxic message.)
(c) เหี้ยเป็นสัตว์เลื้อยคลาน
เหี้ย (varanus salvator) | เป็น (is) | สัตว์เลื้อยคลาน
(reptile)
Varanus salvator is a reptile.
(This is a non-toxic message.)
Thus, the classification of toxicity should not only depend
on a word, but also the context in which it is used. In order
to achieve this, we need to apply a data-driven approach
because a keyword-based approach is insufficient (Saleem
et al., 2016); we do this by creating a corpus that contains a
variety of examples of toxicity in the Thai language.
3. Dataset Construction and Annotation
3.1. Keyword Dictionary Construction
Because toxic posts often contain toxic words, we used
toxic words as the keywords to retrieve the data for our dic-
tionary. We selected some toxic words from the Conceptual
Metaphor of Thai Curse Words (Orathai Chinakarapong,
2014) and rechecked spelling using the Royal Institute
Dictionary4. Then, we added some well-known variations
of these toxic words such as “สัส,” which is a spelling
variation of “สัตว์” (The original meaning of this word
is animal and its slang meaning is similar to “damn.”).
Finally, we included a few negative words, for example,
“ฆ่า” (kill) and “แช่ง” (curse), into the set. In total, we
included 44 keywords in this dictionary, which are shown
in Figure 2.
3.2. Data Collection
We used the public Twitter Search API to collect 9,819
tweets from January–December 2017 based on our key-
word dictionary. Then, we selected 75 tweets for each key-
word. In total, we collected 3,300 tweets for annotation.
To ensure quality of data, we set the following selection
criteria.
1. All tweets are selected by humans to prevent word am-
biguity. (The Twitter API selected the tweets based on
characters in the keyword. For example, in the case of
“บ้า(crazy),” the API will also select “บ้านนอก” (coun-
tryside)” which is not our target.)
4http://www.royin.go.th/dictionary
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2. The length of the tweet should be sufficiently long to
discern the context of the tweet. Hence, we set five
words as the minimum limit.
3. The tweets that contain only extremely toxic words,
(for example: “damn, retard, bitch, f*ck, slut!!!”) are
not considered.
4. In addition, we allowed tweets with English words if
they were not critical elements in the labeling deci-
sion, for example, the word “f*ck.” As a result, our
corpus contains English words, but they are less than
2% of the total.
All hashtags, re-tweets, and links were removed from these
tweets. However, we did not delete emoticons because
these emotional icons can imply the real intent of the post
owners. Furthermore, only in the case of annotation, some
entries such as the names of famous people were replaced
with a tag <ไม่ขอเปิดเผยชื่อ>, for anonymity to prevent in-
dividual bias.
3.3. Annotation
We manually annotated our dataset with two labels: Toxic
and Non-Toxic. We define a message as toxic if it indicates
any harmful, damage, or negative intent based on our def-
inition of toxicity. Furthermore, all the tweets were anno-
tated by three annotators to identify toxicity; the conditions
used for this identification are presented in the following
list.
• A toxic message is a message that should be deleted
or not be allowed in public.
• A message’s target or consequence must exist. It can
either be an individual or a generalized group based
on a commonality such as religion or ethnicity, or an
entire community.
• Self-complain is not considered toxic, because it is not
harmful to anyone. However, if self-complain is in-
tended to indicate something bad, it will be considered
as toxic.
• Both direct and indirect messages including those with
sarcasm are taken into consideration.
We strictly instructed all the annotators about these con-
cepts and asked them to perform a small test to ensure they
understood these conditions. The annotation process was
divided into two rounds. We asked the candidates to an-
notate their answers in the first round to learn our annota-
tion standard. Then, we asked them to annotate a different
dataset and selected the ones who obtained a full-score for
the second round as an annotator. From among these anno-
tators, 20% of the annotators failed the first round and were
not involved in the final annotation.
4. Corpus Analysis
As previously mentioned, the corpus consists of 3,300
tweets divided into 2,027 toxic tweets and 1,273 non-toxic
tweets. The labels are assigned based on majority deci-
sions. The numbers of tweets with perfect agreement, re-
ferred to as gold standard tweets, are 1,692 and 1,093 for
toxic and non-toxic cases, respectively. The inter-annotator
agreement (Fleiss’ Kappa) (Carletta, 1996) is 0.78, which
shows that the agreement is significant.
There are three primary reasons for disagreement. First,
more than 35% of tweets that annotators disagreed upon
are difficult to judge as toxic or non-toxic because of sar-
casm. Second, it is ambiguous whether a message owner
is self-complaining or referring to someone else or some
group by cunning to avoid defamation. Lastly, there are
some cases where word sense ambiguity is affected by the
annotation. For example; “Damn it, I want to commit ar-
son on the university,” which can imply that he/she is very
stressed out and just wants to complain. This kind of sar-
castic expression is quite common in Thailand. However,
there is a possibility that the owner of the comment really
intends to commit such a crime.
The distribution of toxic and non-toxic tweets is shown in
Figure 2. Interestingly, the tweets that contain toxic words
related to animals are less likely to be toxic than the rest
except in the cases of “แมงดา” (pimp/horseshoe crabs)
and “ควาย” (stupid/buffalo). Most of the non-toxic cases
for “แมงดา” refer to one of Thailand’s popular dish that
is made from horseshoe crabs while “ควาย” seems to be
rarely used for its literal meaning of buffalo. Moreover, the
words that related to bottom like “ตํ่า” (low) and “ส้นตีน”
(heel) are commonly used in a toxic manner because they
are antonyms to the words “top” or “high” which Thai peo-
ple believe indicate a sacred position like a head. The word
“โง”่ (stupid) seems to be used in a non-toxic manner rather
than for toxic purposes. Based on the non-toxic tweets
from our corpus, we found that people tend to use the
word “stupid” whenever they want to blame themselves.
Moreover, as part of everyday conversation, people use the
word “หมา” (dog) not only as an insult, but also to refer
to a pet or as an adorable joke. Surprisingly, the usage of
the word “ชั่ว” (wicked) is not limited as a toxic word, but
we found that, in everyday conversation, like in the case of
teaching or reporting a situation, it is used in a non-toxic
manner as well. Finally, the word “สัตว”์ (animal) is used
by people for its original non-toxic meaning. This is in
contrast to its variations such as “สัส” and “สัด,” which are
more likely to be used in a toxic manner.
In the case of toxic tweets, we found that a word, “ควย,”
which refers to f*ck or genitalia, is highly toxic and
unpleasant regardless of the level of contextual toxicity.
Some tweets are difficult to label leading to inconsistency
in annotation as shown in Table 1. Moreover, Thai people
often use metaphors in their conversations as indicated in
the example below.
กินกะหรี่ปั๊บอร่อยไม่เหมือนกินกะหรี่
กิน (eat) | กะหรี่ปั๊บ (curry puff) | อร่อย
(yummy/delicious) | ไม่ (not) | เหมือน (similar to) |
กิน (eat) | กะหรี่ (curry? whore?)
Eating curry puff is yummy not like eating curry (whore?).
In such cases, it is difficult to ascertain the meaning of the
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Table 1: Top three conflicts in annotation agreement.
Keywords (origi-
nal/toxic meaning)
Disagreement of tweets (%)
กะหรี่ (curry/whore) 22.7
ห่า (damn)
หอก (spear/bitch) 21.3
ฉิบหาย (woeful)
ตอแหล (lie)
เห็บ (tick/parasite)
ปลวก (termite/ugly)
ประสาท (nerve/insane) 20.0
ส้นตีน (heel)
ดัดจริต (pretentious)
แช่ง (curse)
จัญไร (beastly)
word “กะหร่ี”; thus, its purpose is vague and could either
indicate a warning or be an attack against someone. These
types of tweets are common in Thai Twitter because peo-
ple avoid mentioning the target of the message directly to
prevent legal repercussions or other issues.
5. Classification Experiment
5.1. Data
Aside from the steps performed for annotation, we conduct
further tweet data cleaning after we have segmented the
tweets into tokens using the Deepcut library version 0.65.
1. We normalized repetitive letters, for example,
“มากกก” to “มาก” and “5555...” to “555.” The pro-
nunciation in Thai for number 5 is “Ha,” therefore,
people always use it as a substitute for the laugh sound.
2. We removed stopwords and punctuation marks except
“?” and “!” because they may be related to some emo-
tions.
3. We removed non-Thai words.
In order to make a fair comparison, the training data is cre-
ated by selecting equal number of toxic and non-toxic in-
stances from the corpus; in particular, we selected 1,888
tweets with 944 toxic tweets and 944 non-toxic tweets. All
of these tweets were selected randomly. Furthermore, each
keyword must have an equal number of tweets for both la-
bels and the maximum number of tweets per label is 30. For
test data, we used 176 tweets from among the gold standard
tweets with 2 toxic tweets and 2 non-toxic tweets per key-
word.
5.2. Setting
For classification, we use the CountVectorizer method from
the scikit-learn library version 0.196 to create bag-of-word
5https://github.com/rkcosmos/deepcut
6https://github.com/scikit-learn/
scikit-learn
Table 2: Classification result.
Method Precision Recall F1-Score
Logistic Regression 0.87 0.70 0.78
Keyword Baseline 0.50 1.00 0.67
features and set the threshold to 10 for minimum docu-
ment frequency. From the same library, we tuned hyper-
parameters for the LogisticRegression method using the
GridSearchCV method. We setup the hyper-parameters as
follows.
1. C value: 0.001, 0.01, 0.1, 1, 10.
2. Fit intercept: True or False.
3. Penalty: L1 or L2.
Finally, our baseline is to set all predictions of toxic
tweets according to the keyword-based approach, because
all tweets contain toxic keywords.
5.3. Results and Discussion
Table 2 shows the experimental results. The best accuracy
is 0.80, when the hyper-parameters are C = 0.1, Fit intercept
= True, and Penalty = L2. We obtained 9 false negatives and
26 false positives, as can be seen in Figure 3. Compared
with the keyword baseline method, our classification results
are better in terms of precision and F1-score.
Although the keyword-based approaches are popular for
performing this type of classification, it failed to correctly
classify some tweets, as in the following example, which is
a Thai-English translated tweet: “Damn, just finished laun-
dry and it’s raining.” In contrast, our approach correctly
classified it as non-toxic.
Furthermore, in our approach, the primary reason for an er-
ror in the case of a false positive is complaining in a tweet,
examples of which are given in Table 3. The cases of false
negatives are primarily because of the following two rea-
sons.
1. Tweets that contain both toxic words and positive
words such as “good” or “beautiful.”
2. Tweets that contain unknown or low document fre-
quency words in our model.
The examples of false negatives are shown in Table 4.
Because our corpus is small, surface features are insuffi-
cient for abbreviation, slang, and unknown words; thus, we
need to increase the size of our dictionary to let the model
learn more words. In addition, we are aware that using only
bag-of-word features is not sufficient for tweet classifica-
tion; therefore, we will explore more efficient approaches
in a future study.
Furthermore, we admit that the auto-segmentation is not
perfect, which affects the classification. For example,
a tweet that includes a wrong word segmentation like
“อะอีดอก” gets incorrectly predicted as non-toxic. The
right segmentation should be “อะ (affix) | อี (impolite
prefix) | ดอก (bitch)” and with this, the prediction is toxic.
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Figure 2: Distribution of toxic and non-toxic tweets based on keywords.
Despite some errors, our auto-segmentation method is con-
siderably effective referring to the examples below.
(a) ถึงคุณรวยล้นฟ้าแต่ไร้นํ้าใจก็ยากที่คนจะศรัทธา (Despite
of being a millionaire, but without kindness, no-
body will respect you.) which auto-segmentation and
human-segmentation are same.
ถึง (to/although) | คุณ (you) | รวย (rich) | ล้น
(overflow) | ฟ้า (sky) | แต่ (but) | ไร้ (without)
| น้ําใจ (kindness) | ก็ (then) | ยาก (hard) | ที่
(at/that) | คน (person/people) | จะ (will) | ศรัทธา
(faith).
(b) คนเห็นแก่ตัวที่ไม่เคยเห็นใจคนอื่น (A selfish person
who never care for others.)
auto-segmentation: คน (person/people) | เห็น (see)
| แก่ (for) | ตัว (self) | ที่ (at/that) | ไม่ (no) | เคย
(ever) | เห็นใจ (sympathetic) | คน (person/people)
| อื่น (another)
human-segmentation: คน (person/people) |
เห็นแก่ตัว (selfish) | ที่ (at/that) | ไม่เคย (never) |
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Table 3: Examples of false positives.
Tweet text (English translation) Toxic keyword True label Predicted label
Since this morning, the dormitory internet is damn and even now, it is
still damn.
damn Non-toxic Toxic
I want to shout f*ck but all I can say is yes sir. f*ck Non-toxic Toxic
Table 4: Examples of false negatives.
Tweet text (English translation) Toxic keyword True label Predicted label
You damn, Just go to die for better. damn Toxic Non-toxic
Damn, you’re annoying. You are just pretty but stupid. damn, stupid Toxic Non-toxic
Figure 3: Confusion matrix of toxicity classification.
เห็นใจ (sympathetic) | คนอื่น (others)
6. Conclusions and Future work
With the increasing popularity of social media in Thailand,
the growth of toxicity in online conversation is a growing
concern. To the best of our knowledge, there is no public
Thai resource related to online toxicity. In this study, we
present toxicity annotation for a Thai Twitter Corpus along
with a supervised classification method as a preliminary ex-
ploration for toxicity analysis in the Thai language.
In the future, we plan to not only enhance the classifica-
tion method, but also improve our model and use streaming
data for the dataset to eliminate bias involved with using
keywords. Our improved model will be used to extend the
volume of the Thai toxicity corpus.
Furthermore, aside from the corpus, we intend to increase,
both, the size and content of our dictionary to include var-
ious other language entities, such as word variations and
abbreviations by applying semantic orientation (Turney,
2002). Our dictionary will not only provide the English
translation for Thai toxic words, but also examples for each
word. We hope to enlarge our corpus with this new dictio-
nary to make it a sufficient and reliable resource for Thai
language analysis in the future. Finally, we might consider
using other content such as re-tweets or previous conversa-
tions to provide a better understanding regarding the inten-
tions of the messages in a future study.
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Abstract
Hateful comments, swearwords and sometimes even death threats are becoming a reality for many people today in online environments.
This is especially true for journalists, politicians, artists, and other public figures. This paper describes how hate directed towards
individuals can be measured in online environments using a simple dictionary-based approach. We present a case study on Swedish
politicians, and use examples from this study to discuss shortcomings of the proposed dictionary-based approach. We also outline
possibilities for potential refinements of the proposed approach.
1. Introduction
Digital environments provide an enormously large and ac-
cessible platform for people to express a broad range of be-
havior — perhaps even broader than what can be expressed
in real world environments, due to the lack of social ac-
countability in many digital environments. Hate and prej-
udice are examples of such behaviors that are overrepre-
sented in digital environments. Hate messages in particular
are quite common, and have increased significantly in re-
cent years. In fact, many, if not most, digital newspapers
have closed down the possibility to comment on articles
since the commentary fields have been overflowing with
hate messages and racist comments (Gardiner et al., 2016).
To many journalists, politicians, artists, and other public
figures, hate messages and threats have become a part of
daily life. A recent study on Swedish journalists showed
that almost 3 out of 4 journalists received threats and in-
sulting comments through emails and social media (Nils-
son, 2015).
Several attempts to automatically detect hate messages
in online environments have been made. For example,
Warner and Hirschberg (2012) use machine learning cou-
pled with template-based features to detect hate speech in
user-generated web content with promising results. Wester
et al. (2016) examine the effects of various types of linguis-
tic features for detecting threats of violence in a corpus of
YouTube comments, and find promising results even using
simple bag-of-words representations. On the other hand,
Ross et al. (2016) examine the reliability of annotations of
hate speech, and find that the annotator agreement is very
low, indicating that hate speech detection is a very challeng-
ing problem. The authors suggest that hate speech should
be seen as a continuous rather then as a binary problem, and
that detailed instructions for the annotators are needed to
improve the reliability of hate speech annotation. Waseem
and Hovy (2016) examine the effect of various types of
features on hate speech detection, and find that character
n-grams and gender information provide the best results.
Davidson et al. (2017) argues that lexical methods suffer
from low precision and aims to separate hate speech from
other instances of offensive language. Their results show
that while racist and homophobic content are classified as
hate speech, this is not the case for sexist content, which il-
lustrates the challenge in separating hate speech from other
instances of offensive language.
The apparent lack of consensus regarding the difficulty of
the hate speech detection problem suggests that the prob-
lem of hate speech detection deserves further study. This
paper contributes to the discussion in two ways. Firstly,
we provide a psychological perspective on the concept of
hate. Secondly, we present a study of the advantages and
disadvantages of using the arguably simplest possible ap-
proach to hate speech detection: that of counting occur-
rences of keywords based on dictionaries of terms related
to hate speech. The main goal of this paper is to provide
a critical discussion about the possibility of monitoring tar-
geted hate in online environments.
This paper is outlined as follows. Section 2 discusses
the psychological aspects of hate and how hate messages
can have various level of severity. Section 3 presents
a dictionary-based approach to measure hate directed to-
wards individuals. Section 4 provides a case study where
we analyze hate speech targeted towards 23 Swedish politi-
cians on immigration-critical websites, and discuss chal-
lenges and directions for future work. Finally, Section 5
provides some concluding remarks.
2. On hate
In the psychological literature hate is thought to be a combi-
nation to two components: one cognitive and one emotional
(Sternberg and Sternberg, 2008). The cognitive component
can be threat perceptions caused for example by out-group
members, but it can also involve devaluation or a nega-
tive view of others. The emotional component on the other
hand involves emotions such as contempt, disgust, fear, and
anger that are generally evoked by the cognitive compo-
nent. Defined in this way, hates shares much with prejudice,
which is defined as negative evaluations or devaluations of
others based on their group membership. Like hate, prej-
udice is argued to be consisting of a cognitive component
(stereotypes about others), an emotional component (dis-
like of others) and a behavioral component (acting in ac-
cordance with the emotional and cognitive component (All-
port, 1954)). Hate, like prejudice, functions as the motiva-
tional force when people behave in harmful ways toward
others.
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Category Sample terms (ENG) Sample terms (SWE) Normalized frequency per category
Swearword fuck, shit, gay fan, skit, bo¨g 0.00137
Anger is crazy, idiot, enemy a¨r galen, idiot, fiende 0.00106
Naughtiness clown, is an idiot, stupid clown, a¨r en idiot, kna¨pp 0.00076
General threat kidnap, be followed, hunt kidnappa, bo¨r fo¨rfo¨ljas, jaga 0.00068
Death threat should be killed, ruin, bomb borde do¨das, utrota, bomba 0.00031
Sexism whore, bitch, should be raped hora, subban, borde va˚ldtas 0.00005
Table 1: Different categories of hate with representative terms and normalized frequency.
Hate is commonly directed toward individuals and groups
but it is also expressed toward other targets in the social
world. For example, it is common that hate is expressed to-
ward concepts (e.g. communism) or countries (e.g. USA).
It is important to note however that there is some disagree-
ment about not only the definition but also the behavioral
outcomes of hate. For example, while some see hate lead-
ing to behavioral tendencies such as withdrawal caused by
disgust or fear, others see hate as the manifestation of anger
or rage, which lead one to approach, or attack, the object of
hate (Edward et al., 2005).
Dealing with digital environments, the disagreement about
behavioral tendencies might seem less relevant. Specifi-
cally, withdrawal caused by disgust or fear in the real world
is not the same in digital environment where withdrawal
would not be necessary — or approach would not be a di-
rect threat to wellbeing. Acknowledging the disagreements
noted above, we aim to examine hate messages with vari-
ous level of severity varying between swearwords directed
to individuals to outright death threats.
3. Monitoring hate
This work focuses on detecting hate messages and expres-
sions directed towards individuals. The messages can have
various level of severity with respect to individual integrity
and individual differences in perception of threat. More
specifically, we examine six different categories: anger,
naughtiness, swearwords, general threats, and death threats.
While the two categories naughtiness and anger may over-
lap in some aspects, they were aimed to capture different
expressions and causes of hate speech, with naughtiness in-
dicating to the speaker’s tendency to misbehave and gen-
erally express naughtiness toward others, and anger being
an emotional state triggered by something in the surround-
ing and leading to the expression of anger (and/or naugh-
tiness) towards a person. We also include sexism (degra-
dation of women), since it is commonly used for devalua-
tive purposes. Each category is represented by a dictionary
of terms, as exemplified in Table 1. Our study focuses on
Swedish data, but to ease understanding we have translated
some of the words to English. Note that the dictionaries
may contain both unigrams and multiword expressions.
The dictionaries are constructed in a manner similar to
Tulkens et al. (2016b; 2016a); human experts (psychologist
and computer scientist) manually study a large number of
posts from the text domain of interest (see further Section
4.1.) and record significant words and phrases. In order to
improve the recall of the dictionaries, a word embedding
is then used to suggest other relevant terms to the experts.
This is done by simply computing the 15 nearest neighbors
in the embedding space to each term in the dictionaries. For
each term suggestion, the expert has the choice to either in-
clude or reject the term suggestion. We note that it is also
possible to cast the term suggestion task as an active learn-
ing problem, in which a classifier is iteratively refined to
identify useful term suggestions based on the expert’s feed-
back (Gyllensten and Sahlgren, 2018).
As embedding, we use Gensim’s (Rˇehu˚rˇek and Sojka,
2010) implementation of the Continuous Bag of Words
(CBOW) model (Mikolov et al., 2013), which builds word
vectors by training a 2-layer neural network to predict a
target word based on a set of context words. The network
learns two sets of vectors, one for the target terms (the em-
bedding vectors), and one for context terms. The objective
of the network is to learn vectors such that their dot product
correspond to the log likelihood of observing word pairs in
the training data. We use default parameters for the em-
beddings, with a window size set to 5. The embeddings
are trained on a collection of immigration-critical websites,
further discussed in Section 4.1.. Note that the embedding
method does not handle multiword units in any special way;
if multiword units are to be included in the analysis, they
need to be incorporated in the data as a preprocessing step.
The expanded dictionaries are used to detect and moni-
tor hate by simple frequency counting; if a term from one
of the dictionaries occurs in the vicinity of a mention of
a target individual, we increment the count for that cate-
gory. This is arguably the simplest possible approach to
hate speech monitoring, and many types of refinements are
possible, such as weighting of the dictionary entries (Eisen-
stein, 2017), handling of negation (Reitan et al., 2015), and
scope detection. We will return to a more detailed discus-
sion of problems with the proposed approach in Section
4.3.. At this point, we note that one possible advantage
of using such a simple approach is its transparency; it is
easy to understand a simple frequency counter for a non-
technical end user.
Of course, transparency and comprehensibility are useless
if the method generates an excessive amount of false posi-
tives. The only way for us to control the precision of the fre-
quency counting is to delimit the context within which oc-
currences of dictionary terms are counted; a narrow context
window spanning something like one to three words around
a target individual’s name will reduce the probability that a
term from one of the dictionaries refers to something other
than the target name. In the following case study, we opt for
the most conservative approach and use a context of only
one term on each side of the target name.
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Website # comments # words
avpixlat.info 2 904 933 99 472 281
nordfront.se 89 495 3 125 218
nyatider.nu 2 176 124 949
motgift.nu 1 380 68 992
nordiskungdom.com 117 6 530
Table 2: The websites included in our study.
4. Case study
To exemplify the dictionary-based approach, we have ex-
amined the expression of the different categories of hate
toward 23 national-level politicians (10 males and 13 fe-
males). Studying national-level politicians in Sweden is
timely as we are approaching the Swedish parliament elec-
tion in September 2018. There have also been recent alarms
on politicians threatening to leave politics because of an in-
creasing amount of hate being expressed in recent years.
Our analyses are based on text from commentary fields on
immigration critical websites from September 2014 to De-
cember 2017. The time period was chosen to cover a single
electoral period in the Swedish parliament.
As target names, we use the full names of the politicians.
This is obviously a crude simplification that severely af-
fects the recall of the approach, since people are often re-
ferred to using only their first name, a pronoun, or, in the
data we studied, some negative nickname or slur. As an ex-
ample, the Swedish prime minister, Stefan Lo¨fven, is often
referred to in online discussions as “svetsarn” (the welder),
or using negative nicknames such as “Ro¨fven”, which is a
paraphrase of “ro¨ven” (in English “the ass”).
4.1. Data
In Sweden, as well as in several other European coun-
tries, there has been a recent surge in activity and forma-
tion of movements that are critical of immigration. These
immigration-critical groups show a high interactivity on so-
cial media and on websites. In Sweden, there are several
digital immigration-critical milieus with a similar structure:
articles published by editorial staff and user-generated com-
ments. The commentary fields are not moderated, which
makes the comments an important scene to express hate to-
ward journalists, politicians, artists, and other public fig-
ures. The comment section allows readers to respond to
an editorial article instantly. The editorial articles gener-
ally focuses on topics such as crimes, migration, politics
and societal issues. The websites that we have studied are
listed in Table 2. For each website, we have downloaded all
comments between 2014/09/01 to 2017/10/01. Note that
the embeddings used for term suggestions are also trained
on this data.
4.2. Results
Table 3 shows the how many times each minister is men-
tioned in the comments with his or hers full name dur-
ing the given time period. Obviously, the Prime Minister
Stefan Lo¨fven is the most frequently mentioned politician,
with more than 10,000 mentions during the analyzed pe-
riod. The second most mentioned politician in the studies
Name Mentions
Stefan Lo¨fven 10 663
Morgan Johansson 3 142
Margot Wallstro¨m 2 681
Magdalena Andersson 1 931
Ylva Johansson 1 524
Gustav Fridolin 1 113
Alice Bah Kuhnke 567
Peter Eriksson 248
Peter Hultqvist 228
Isabella Lo¨vin 184
Mikael Damberg 169
Ardalan Shekarabi 158
A˚sa Regne´r 136
Ann Linde 128
Annika Strandha¨ll 98
Ibrahim Baylan 61
Per Bolund 48
Anna Ekstro¨m 36
Hele´ne Fritzon 36
Helene Hellmark Knutsson 14
Karolina Skog 11
Sven-Erik Bucht 8
Table 3: Number of times each Swedish minister is men-
tioned in the comments during the time period.
data is Morgan Johansson, the Swedish Minister of Justice
and Home Affairs, and the third most mentioned minister is
Margot Wallstro¨m, Minister for Foreign Affairs.
Figure 1 (next page) shows the amount of hate towards the
Swedish ministers. The left figure shows simple frequency
counts of hate terms in the immediate vicinity of each tar-
get name, while the right figure shows the proportions of
targeted hate toward the Swedish ministers, calculated as
the frequency of each hate category in the context of each
politician, divided by the total number of mentions for that
politician. In both figures, it is obvious that naughtiness (in
purple) is the most frequent category for the politicians as a
group, followed by anger (in red), swearwords (in yellow)
and general threat (in gray). We do not see any sexism and
no explicit death threats in our data, most likely due to the
very narrow context used in these experiments.
Figure 1 shows that the most frequently mentioned minis-
ters are also those who receive the most hate in the data
we have studied. However, when looking at the propor-
tions of hateful comments for each minister, we see that
the most mentioned politician (Stefan Lo¨fven) is not the
minister with the proportionally most hateful comments.
This is instead Mikael Damberg, the Minister for Enterprise
and Innovation. However, Damberg is only mentioned 169
times in the data, and a mere 1.18% of these contain hate;
that is, only 2 mentions of 169. It is a similar situation with
Ann Linde, the Minister for EU Affairs and Trade, who has
the proportionally most general threats in her mentions, but
this is based on only 1 mention out of 128. Isabella Lo¨vin,
the Minister for International Development Cooperation, is
the target of the proportionally most naughtiness, but also
in this case, this is only 1 mention out of 184.
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Figure 1: Amount of hate contexts for Swedish ministers (using only the preceding and succeeding terms). The left figure
shows simple frequency counts of hate terms, while the right figure shows proportions (i.e. counts divided by the total
number of mentions).
4.3. Discussion
The results in Figure 1 demonstrate that even with such a
simple and naı¨ve method as the one used in this paper, it
is possible to do a general and rudimentary form of threat
assessment based on mentions in social media data. The
method is sufficiently simple to be adaptable to many dif-
ferent scenarios, and sufficiently transparent for end-users
to understand. However, we do pay a price for the simplic-
ity.
As we noted in the last section, expressions of hate seem to
correlate with frequency of mention (at least in the data we
have studied). This makes the left part of Figure 1 less inter-
esting. On the other hand, counting proportions, as we do in
the right part of the figure, risks overestimating the signifi-
cance of very rare events. A perhaps more useful measure
might be to calculate deviations from the expected amount
of hateful comments for each minister. As an example,
Morgan Johansson is mentioned 3 142 by his full name in
our data. Based on the normalized category frequencies in
Table 3, we should expect that 4 of these mentions contain
swearwords, 3 contain anger, 2 contain naughtiness, and
2 contain general threat. Looking at the actual frequency
counts, we see that 3 mentions contain swearwords, 8 con-
tain anger, 14 contain naughtiness, and 5 contain general
threat. For the last three categories, the actual counts are
much higher than would be expected, indicating that these
are significant measurements.
Table 4 (next page) shows the deviations from expected
counts per category for each minister. The deviation is com-
puted as the actual counts minus the expected counts:
#(m, c)−
(
#(c)
T
·#(m)
)
(1)
where #(m, c) is the actual co-occurrence count of a min-
ister and a category, #(c)T is the relative frequency of a cat-
egory in the data #(c) is the frequency of the category and
T is the total number of words in the data), and #(m) is
the frequency of mention of a minister.
This is a obviously a severely oversimplified probabilistic
model, but it does provide useful information. We note that
the columns for death threats and sexism only contain nega-
tive or zero values, which indicates that no significant death
threats or sexism is being expressed towards the ministers
in the data. Two ministers have higher general threats than
can be expected, and a few more have higher swearwords
and anger, but the deviations for these categories in our data
are not very large. The highest deviation in our study is
the naughtiness category for the prime minister, which in-
dicates that he is the subject of a significant amount of neg-
ative remarks in the data we have studied. Another poten-
tially interesting observandum is the combination of cate-
gories that have positive deviations for the different min-
isters. To take two examples, Morgan Johansson has pos-
itive deviations for anger, naughtiness and general threat,
while Ylva Johansson has positive deviations for swear-
words, anger and naughtiness. One might hypothesize that
the combination of anger and general threat deserves more
attention than the combination of swearwords and naughti-
ness.
The perhaps most obvious drawback of the approach used
in this paper is that it will only detect hate in direct rela-
tion to a full name, but not in relation to pronouns or slang
expressions referring to the person in question; i.e. the ap-
proach suffers from a lack of coreference resolution. This
will obviously affect the recall of the method, which is a
serious shortcoming that risks missing critical mentions. In
the present analysis, we have no idea whether the lack of
death threats in our results is due to an actual absence of
death threats in the data, or whether it is due to omissions
in the analysis.
Although we delimit the context as much as possible to only
include the preceding and succeeding terms, our results are
still affected by false positives. There are three basic error
types for false positives in our analysis. One is negated
statements, such as (hate term in boldface):
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Person Swearword Anger Naughtiness General threat Death threat Sexism
Stefan Lo¨fven 0.98 3.29 16.49 −2.65 −3.15 −0.46
Morgan Johansson −1.16 2.82 2.77 2.32 −0.93 −0.14
Margot Wallstro¨m 1.5 2.32 3.12 −1.41 −0.79 −0.12
Magdalena Andersson −1.56 −1.96 0.63 −1.03 −0.57 −0.08
Ylva Johansson 2.95 1.43 1.9 −0.83 −0.46 −0.07
Gustav Fridolin 1.51 −0.14 2.2 −0.6 −0.33 −0.05
Alice Bah Kuhnke 0.24 −0.58 −0.4 −0.3 −0.17 −0.02
Peter Eriksson 0.67 0.74 −0.18 −0.13 −0.08 −0.01
Peter Hultqvist −0.29 −0.22 −0.15 −0.12 −0.06 −0.01
Isabella Lo¨vin −0.24 −0.18 0.87 −0.1 −0.05 −0.01
Mikael Damberg 0.77 0.83 −0.12 −0.09 −0.05 −0.01
Ardalan Shekarabi −0.21 −0.16 −0.11 −0.08 −0.05 −0.01
A˚sa Regne´r −0.18 −0.14 −0.1 −0.07 −0.04 −0.01
Ann Linde −0.17 −0.13 −0.09 0.93 −0.04 −0.01
Annika Strandha¨ll −0.13 −0.1 −0.07 −0.05 −0.03 0
Ibrahim Baylan −0.08 −0.06 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 0
Per Bolund −0.06 −0.05 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0
Anna Ekstro¨m −0.05 −0.04 −0.03 −0.02 −0.01 0
Hele´ne Fritzon −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0 0
Helene Hellmark Knutsson −0.02 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0 0
Karolina Skog −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 −0.01 0 0
Table 4: Deviation from expected counts per category for each minister. Positive scores indicate that the actual count is
higher than the expected count.
jag tror inte Stefan Lo¨vfen a¨r dum
(I don’t think Stefan Lo¨vfen is stupid)
Handling negations is a well-known issue in both informa-
tion retrieval and sentiment analysis, and one could think
of several different ways to deal with negations. The per-
haps most simple method is to use a skip or flip function
that skips a sequence of text when having encountered a
negation, or simply flips the sentiment of the negated text
(Choi and Cardie, 2009). It is of course also necessary to
determine the scope of the negation, which is a non-trivial
problem in itself (Lazib et al., 2016).
Another error type in our analysis is quotes, such as:
vi har varit naiva [sa] Stefan Lo¨fven
(we have been naive [said] Stefan Lo¨fven)
The “said” is implicit, and is signaled by quotation marks
and punctuation in the original data. However, when using
aggressive tokenization, such punctuation is normally re-
moved, which leads to the above type of errors. Retaining
punctuation would obviously be one way to prevent such
errors. Another possibility is to use a dependency parse of
the data, which would rearrange the context according to
the dependency structure. “Naive” would then be closer to
“we” than to “Stefan Lo¨fven”.
A third error type that is related to the previous one is mis-
interpreting (or ignoring) the semantic roles of the proposi-
tion. Consider the following examples:
la˚t regeringen med Stefan Lo¨vfen hota
med nyval
(let the government with Stefan Lo¨vfen threaten with new
election)
vi skiter i om du blir fo¨rbannad Stefan
Lo¨vfen
(we don’t care if you get upset Stefan Lo¨vfen)
Stefan Lo¨fven is not the target of hate in neither of these
cases. Instead, he (or in the first case, he and the Swedish
government) is the agent of the predicates “threatened”
vs. “upset”. In order to resolve agency of the predicates,
we would need to do semantic role labeling, which assigns
a semantic role to each participant of a proposition. Iden-
tifying the agent of the predicate becomes even more im-
portant when increasing the context size, since it will also
increase the number of false positives when only counting
occurrences of hate terms.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have aimed to measure how online hate is
directed toward national-level politicians in Sweden. This
is an important and timely endeavor because the expression
of online hate is becoming increasingly pervasive in online
forums, especially toward this specific group. The expres-
sion of hate has shown to have downstream consequences
not only for individuals who are targeted, but also for our
democratic society and core liberal values. Recent stud-
ies show that the frequent exposure to hate speeches does
not only lead to increased devaluation and prejudice (So-
ral et al., 2017), but may also increase dehumanization of
the targeted group (Fasoli et al., 2016). Dehumanization in
return makes the targeted groups or individuals seem less
than human, legitimizing and increasing the likelihood of
violence (Rai et al., 2017). Moreover, online hate does not
only play a significant role in shaping people’s attitudes and
beliefs toward certain groups, but it also have far-reaching
consequences for societies in general, such as increasing
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tendency to violating social norms and threatening demo-
cratic core values.
As we mentioned in the introduction, many digital newspa-
pers in Sweden and other countries have closed down the
possibility to comment on articles due to the degree of hate
expressed by some users. This is a clear example of how
online hate restricts and threatens one of the core values
of democracy. That is the freedom to express your views
and opinions. To prevent such harmful effects it is impor-
tant to monitor and measure how and toward whom hate is
expressed online.
The second aim of this study was to address some of the
gaps in the field. As noted in the introduction, the con-
temporary approaches to measuring online hate are marked
by the apparent lack of consensus regarding the difficulty
of the hate speech detection. The approach for monitor-
ing targeted hate that we have described in this work is a
simple yet powerful way to understand hate messages di-
rected toward individuals. The strength of this method lies
in its simplicity and transparency, and perhaps also for hav-
ing more conservative criteria that reduces the number of
false positives. We have also identified a number of ways
to improve the method, including the use of coreference
resolution, handling of negation, context refinement using
dependency parsing, and agency detection using seman-
tic role labeling.
The trade-off between complexity and performance, and
between recall and precision, are challenging dilemmas for
law enforcement and other end users of hate monitoring
tools. Acknowledging these dilemmas, future improve-
ments of hate monitoring should be directed toward the
optimal cut-off where usefulness for law enforcement can
meet ease of conduct when it comes to analyzing data.
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Abstract
Given the widespread use of social media and their increasingly impactful role in our lives today, there is a pressing need to ensure their
safety of use. In particular, various social groups view the spread of adult content in social networks as undesirable. This content may
even pose a serious threat to other vulnerable groups (e.g. children). In this work, we develop a unique, large-scale dataset of adult
content in Arabic Twitter and provide in-depth analyses of the data. The dataset enables us to study the scope and distribution of adult
content in the Arabic version of the network, thus possibly uncovering target phic locales. In addition, computationally exploit the data
to learn a large lexicon specific to the topic and detect spreaders of adult content on the microblogging platform. Our models achieve
promising results, reaching 79% accuracy on the task (24% higher than a competitive baseline).
1. Introduction
Social media continues to play an increasingly important
role in our lives, making it necessary to keep these plat-
forms safe and free from ‘undesirable’ content. Undesir-
able postings come in many forms, including deceptive
(Westerman et al., 2014), hateful (Williams and Burnap,
2015), abusive (Mubarak et al., 2017), dangerous (Fuchs,
2017; Sikkens et al., 2017), and adult content (Abozinadah,
2015). Identification of spreaders of unsolicited content is
beneficial not only for user satisfaction, but also for the
safety of individuals and communities alike.
In the Arab world, social media are widely used (Lenze,
2017). This is especially the case for the Twitter plat-
form where, according to some estimates (Salem, 2017),
the number of monthly active users was expected to be 11.1
million as of March 2017. These Arab users send 27.4 mil-
lion tweets per day, almost doubling up from 5.8 million
in 2014 (Salem, 2017). Twitter has also been a very influ-
ential tool in the Arab world, as is evident from its role
in the waves of uprisings the region. In the contexts of
the political and social transformations the Arab world has
witnessed, activists have heavily used the platform for dis-
seminating views antagonistic to several Arab governments
(Khondker, 2011; Gerbaudo, 2012). Similarly, govern-
ments themselves are increasingly using Twitter to spread
content supporting their causes (i.e., propaganda) (Mejova,
2017).
Twitter prohibits the promotion of adult or sexual prod-
ucts, services, and content, whether in images, videos, or
text. 1However, spreaders of undesirable content are ex-
ploiting Twitter’s popularity, and it is not uncommon to
even witness advertising and adult content hashtags trend-
ing (Herzallah et al., 2017).
Popular search engines such as Google and Yahoo provide
“safe search” options to filter out unwanted content. So-
cial media platforms (e.g. Twitter, Facebook, YouTube)
also offer similar options, yet seem to be fighting a more
difficult battle. Efforts to combat unsolicited content, how-
1https://support.twitter.com/articles/
20170427?lang=en
Figure 1: Geographical distribution of adult content in the
Arab world.
ever, does not seem to be very successful thus far, as we
will show. Depending on manually curated lists of words
for use in filtering out adult content is no longer sufficient
since language and techniques employed by spreaders of
these content are constantly evolving. For example, spread-
ers of adult content often intentionally employ misspelled
and/or slang words. Misspellings can be as simple as re-
placing the letter ‘o’ with the digit ‘0’ in a word, which can
enable these users to bypass Twitter’s algorithmic filters.
Filtering out adult content is perhaps especially valuable in
the Arab world, due to religious and cultural sensitivities.
In this work, we seek to alleviate this bottleneck for Arabic
social media. We make the following contributions: (1) we
build a large-scale dataset of Arabic adult content; (2) we
learn large-scale lexica (based on hashtags, unigrams, and
bigrams) correlated with adult content from the data; (3)
we perform an in-depth analysis of the data, thus afford-
ing a better understanding of the dynamics of adult content
sharing and the behavior of its users on Twitter; and (4) we
develop successful predictive models for detecting spread-
ers of adult content.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: In Sec-
tion 2, we review related literature. We describe our dataset
in Section 3, we perform several textual analyses of the data
and describe learning a lexicon of adult content in Section
4. In Section 5, we describe our models for detecting adult
content. Section 6 concludes the paper with our main find-
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ings.
2. Related work
Unsolicited Content on Twitter. Undesirable content can
be prevalent in Twitter. The network is indeed vulnerable
to misuse through posting of undesirable content such as
spams, racist content, hateful speech, threats, and adult con-
tent. This is due to the fact that creating and maintaining an
account on Twitter is fairly easy. Unlike Facebook, where
anonymity is at least theoretically not possible, anonymity
is easier on Twitter. This possibly translates to more un-
desirable content. The work of Grier et al. (2010) is rele-
vant to the scope of unsolicited or spam content on Twitter.
The authors studied 25 million URLs posted on Twitter and
found that 8% of content in these URLs are spam. Analyz-
ing the click-through rate of those spam tweets, they found
that around 0.13% of them generate a site visit. This rate is
much higher than the click-through rate reported for spam
emails (Kanich et al., 2008). This implies that the number
of spammers on Twitter is increasing over time.
Racist and Hateful Speech. A number of studies have
attempted to investigate racists and hateful speech in the
web as well as Twitter. For example, Burnap and Williams
(2014) look at the manifestation and diffusion of hate
speech and antagonistic content in social media in relation
to events that could be classified as ‘trigger’ events for hate
crimes. Their dataset consists of 450k tweets collected a
two weeks window in the immediate aftermath of Drummer
Lee Rigbys murder in Woolwich, UK. Using n-gram and
type-dependency features, they implemented probabilistic,
rulebased, and spatial classifiers. The authors reported a
best F-score of 0.77 using the probabilistic classifier. Sim-
ilarly, Davidson et al. (2017) created a hate speech lexi-
con based on a list of phrases and words provided by Hate-
base.org. Using this list, they crawled a set of 85m tweets
containing terms from the lexicon. Then, a random set
of 25k tweets were manually annotated by CrowdFlower
users on three categories: hate speech, offensive, and nei-
ther. They used Logistic Regression and a dictionary to
construct a predictive hate and offensive language model,
which achieved an F1-score of 90%.
Adult Content. Some studies were also devoted to inves-
tigating and detecting adult content online. For example,
Coletto et al. (2016) analyzed 169 million data points on
Tumblr and Flickr and found that although the community
of adult content producers is small, adult content is spread
widely in the networks. While producers of adult content
are clustered in semi-isolated communities on these plat-
forms, they are linked with the rest of the network with a
very high number of what Coletto et al. (2016) called “con-
sumers” (users who do not post new adult content but fol-
low producers of such content, share and like their posts).
The authors maintained that, due to the fact that users in
the network are enabled to see what other users ‘re-post’ or
‘like,’ over a quarter of the all Tumblr users were uninten-
tionally exposed to adult content. The case is no different
in Twitter where users are able to see recently liked tweets
by users they follow. Singh et al. (2016) estimated at least
10 million accounts tweeting and spreading adult content
according as of May 2015.
Singh et al. (2016) employ graph- and content-based fea-
tures extracted from 74k tweets posted by 18k Twitter users
on the same task, reporting 91.96% accuracy. Their analy-
sis shows that adult content users fulfill the characteristics
of spammers as stated by the rules and guidelines of Twit-
ter2. These pioneering works, however, focused on detect-
ing adult or spam content, without providing analyses of
the content itself. Our work exploits a much bigger dataset
(e.g., our dataset is about eight times bigger than (Aboz-
inadah, 2015)), and pays attention to especially the geo-
graphical distribution of targets of the adult content.
Twitter Spam. What increases Twitter users’s exposure to
pornographic tweets is also the fact that trending hashtags
are usually exploited by spammers (Abozinadah, 2015; El-
Mawass and Alaboodi, 2016). This vulnerability of Twitter
users has recently led to a number of studies focusing on an-
alyzing and detecting Twitter ‘spams’ (e.g. (Lin and Huang,
2013; Yang et al., 2013; Wahsheh et al., 2012b; Wahsheh
et al., 2013; Herzallah et al., 2017; Chu et al., 2012; Grier
et al., 2010; El-Mawass and Alaboodi, 2016; Singh et al.,
2016)). A few of these studies were dedicated to spam de-
tection in Arabic social media (e.g. (Wahsheh et al., 2012a;
Wahsheh et al., 2012b)).
Adult Content in Arabic. Early work on Arabic social me-
dia has focused on developing corpora and systems for de-
tecting sentiment (Abdul-Mageed and Diab, 2012; Abdul-
Mageed and Diab, 2011; Abdul-Mageed et al., 2014), aided
by automatic processing tools developed for the language
like ASMA (Abdul-Mageed et al., 2013), and later emotion
(Abdul-Mageed et al., 2016). More related to our work is
research by Abozinadah (2015) and Singh et al. (2016) who
focused on detecting adult content on Arabic and English
Twitter, respectively. Abozinadah (2015) and Abozinadah
and Jones (2017) built a dataset of 1, 000, 300 tweets com-
prising the most recent 50 tweets of 255 users as well as
the most recent 50 tweets of users in their network. The au-
thors then develop a machine learning classifier using dif-
ferent feature sets. They found that lexical features yield
the best performance. As feature input to their classifiers,
the authors extracted basic statistical measures from each
tweet (e.g., average, minimum, maximum, standard devia-
tion, and the total number of URLs, hashtags, picture, men-
tions, and characters). They reported 96% accuracy of adult
content detection.
3. Dataset
We collect a large dataset of tweets with adult content. In
addition, we identify a large network of adult content pro-
ducers (who are also usually spreaders). We explain our
data collection methods in terms of the following steps3:
1. Hashtag seeds: We start by collecting a list of hash-
tags4. associated with adult content by manually in-
2https://support.twitter.com/articles/
64986.
3Due to the nature of this work, in various places of the paper,
we provide examples that involve language that are related to adult
content. Although we use academic norms to present the content
in appropriate way, reader discretion is advised.
4This list can be downloaded from: https://goo.gl/
Qcc1wW.
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specting several relevant tweets. We iteratively expand
the list by adding co-occurring hashtags that clearly
communicate adult content. Our final list is composed
of 100 hashtags that we manually judge as highly con-
nected to adult content. Example hashtags from this
list include º (Eng. “sex”), éªËñÓ (Eng. “horny”),
and ÓñÓ (Eng. “prostitute”).
2. Tweet-level dataset: We use both the Twitter rest and
streaming APIs to crawl tweets employing items from
this list of 100 manually developed hashtags described
above. Using these crawlers, we acquired a dataset of
∼ 27 million tweets. We refer to this dataset as main.
After filtering out retweets and duplicates, we ended
up with a total of 200K tweets. We refer to this dataset
as unique.
3. User-level dataset: We extract all the users who
posted one or more of the tweets in the main dataset
and acquire a total of 20, 621 users. We then crawl the
timelines of these users, possibly fetching up to 3, 200
tweets from each user. We are able to obtain the time-
lines of 11, 648 of these users, making the total num-
ber of tweets from these timelines around 8.6 million.
We could not fetch the tweets of the remaining 8, 973
users for a number of reasons: First, 2, 456 users
were suspended during the period between crawling
the main dataset and the timelines. These users rep-
resents ∼ 11% of all users. Second, 629 users were
not found at the time of user data crawling at all.
These users most likely have deleted their accounts.
The remaining 5, 888 users were found active, but our
crawlers failed to fetch their data due either to (a) their
accounts being protected5 or (b) have no tweets at the
time of crawling. We call this dataset timelines.
See Table 1 for a summary of the datasets and Table2
for a summary of users in our datasets.
Dataset Size (tweets)
Main 27 M
Unique 200 K
Timelines 8.6 M
Table 1: Datasets in the study. Main: All the tweets we
have initially crawled. Unique: Tweets from main after
deduplication and removal of retweets. Timelines: Tweets
from our list of unique list of 11, 648 users’ timelines.
4. Understanding Adult Content
We use our dataset as a basis for understanding adult con-
tent in various ways. First, we build lexica of adult con-
tent in the form of hashtags and n-grams (unigrams and bi-
grams). These can provide a summary of what the involved
5Protected users can only be crawled when the authenticated
user crawling the data either “owns” the timeline or is an approved
follower of the owner. None of these applied to us.
Type of user Freq. %
Active (collected) 11, 648 56.5%
Active (not collected) 5, 888 28.5%
Suspended 2, 456 11.9%
Not found 629 3.1%
Table 2: Types, counts, and percentages of users in our
timelines datasets.
lexical content is like, but can also be used for collecting
adult content in the future for building classifiers. Related
results are presented in Section 4.1. Second, we study the
posting behaviors of adult content users by aggregating im-
portant frequencies from their content. We also present a
description of their network structure via simple follower-
followee statistics (Section 4.2.). The types of media em-
ployed in adult content is another significant aspect of shar-
ing pornography online and hence we also study this aspect
of content in Section 4.4. Adult content users also seem
to have specific practices as to choosing their screen names
on the network. In an attempt to understand these practices,
we analyze a sample from our data in Section 4.3. Finally,
a question that arises is related to the locales this particu-
lar type of business might be targeting and/or most thriving
in. In Section 4.5., we perform an analysis that answers
this exact question. We now turn to describing our findings
related to each of these user and content attributes.
4.1. Lexica of Adult Content
4.1.1. Hashtags
We extract all the hashtags with frequency > 20 in the
dataset, acquiring a total of 21, 907 hashtags. A sample
from the extracted hashtags is in Table 3. The range of
hashtags are related to descriptions of explicit content that
may be accessible via a shared URL in a tweet, a range of
pornographic activities, and references to individuals with
different sexual orientations. The lexicon can be used as
a basis for monitoring online adult content and collecting
even larger data for detecting pornography.
4.1.2. N-grams
We also extract all unigrams and bigrams with frequencies
> 20 from the dataset, acquiring a total of 128, 625 uni-
grams and 243, 953 bigrams. Table 3 shows a sample of
each of these types6. Similar to the hashtag lexicon, the N-
gram lexicon exposes a range of activities related to adult
content, but also clickbait where users are asked to click
on a link to watch adult video or see an explicit photo. This
clearly paints a picture of adult content marketing as a busi-
ness.
4.2. User Timelines
For a deeper understanding of the behaviour of adult con-
tent spreaders, we calculate several measures based on our
timelines dataset. These measures include the average,
median, and mode of (1) total tweets posted per user, (2) to-
tal pornographic hashtags employed by a user, (3) avergae
6The lists of all hashtags, unigrams and bigrams with their
frequencies can be downloaded from: https://goo.gl/
LVig9g.
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Hashtag Uingram Bigram
AR EN AR EN AR EN
º# #sex A 	Jë here º# A 	Jë #sex here
½* 	K# #f*ck ½* 	K f*ch ÉÓA¿ ÕÎJ

	®Ë @ full movie
Ém 	¯# #bull º sex ÉÔgð YëA  watch and download
é 	KñjÜØ# #divorced ÕÎJ

	®Ë @ movie A 	Jë ÕÎJ

	®Ë @ movie here
HñK
X# #cuckold ¡ 	ª 	@ click A 	Jë ÉÓA¿ full here
ÐPAm×# #incest YëA  watch ¡ 	ª 	@ Õç' then click
º_ ÐC 	¯ @# #sex movies A 	g private º# º ¡. @ðP# #sex #sex links
* 	P# #pe*is ÉÓA¿ full ¡. @QË @ ¡ 	ª 	@ ckick the link
I. ËA# #bottom ¡. @QË @ link úÎ« ¡ 	ª 	@ click on
é*m¯# #b*tch ½* 	JK
 fu*king ½* 	K# º# #sex #fu*k
Table 3: A Sample of our Adult Content Lexica. Hashtags (left), unigrams (middle), and bigrams (right).
hashtags used per tweet, and (4) number of friends and fol-
lowers per user. As Table 4 shows, an average adult content
user posts∼ 914 tweets, uses 1.45 hashtags per tweets, and
has ∼ 7, 489 friends and 850 followers in their network.
These statistics show that spreaders of adult content not
only employ hashtags as a mechanism of reaching wider
audiences, but also as a way to adhere to Twitter regula-
tion about pornographic content. The analysis also reveals
that these users are not silos in the network, but rather have
friends and followers.
Mean Median Mode
Total tweets 914.20 235 10
Total hashtags used 1, 370.91 525.50 28
Hashtags per tweet 1.45 0.35 0
Friends 7, 488.70 252 0
Followers 850.30 72 0
Table 4: Descriptive statistics of adult content and user net-
work in our data.
4.3. Screen Names Analysis
We wish to investigate screen names used by adult con-
tent users. To do so, we first randomly sampled 100 adult
users and manually analyzed their screen names. We found
out a number of interesting patterns. As shown in Table
5, the most common screen name pattern consists of one
or more (e.g., age, physical) attributes. For example, in
Õæ
ð ú

	æK
Qå« (EN: “a handsome twenties aged guy”) there
are two adjectives describing both the age and physical at-
tributes of the user. For another example, in Q¢ 	ªJÖÏ @ (EN:
“the arrogant one”), the user chooses to describe his psy-
chological attributes that imply power and pride. In addi-
tion, about 60% of those include more pronounced physical
attributes with clear sexual meanings and an indication of
user gender. Examples include é 	KñjÜØ èXAg. (EN: “horny
and serious female”), Qª Ó H. QK. QÓ (EN: “chubby and hairy
male”), and 	­J
 	J« Ém
	¯
(EN: “violent and potent male”).
Other common screen names are person names, some of
which also contain attributes such as hñJ 	®Ó * ¼ ÉÓ

@ (EN:
“Amal open vag*na”) and HñK. ø
 Xñm.× (EN: “Majoodi bi-
sexual”). It is also not uncommon for screen names to have
city or country names such as èQëA®Ë @ øQåÓ I. ËA (EN:
“Egyptian bottom Cairo”) and 	AK
QË @ I. ËA (EN: “bottom
from Riyadh”). Some users use their email, phone, or so-
cial media account addresses as their screen names. Finally,
some screen names do not seem to follow any specific pat-
terns. Instead, they contain numbers, commas, underscores,
symbols or mixture of these without any apparent meaning
such as ‘-’ and ‘//-//’. To further analyze adult users screen
names, we extract unigrams, bigrams and emoji from all
screen names. Table 6 provides a list of the top 10 uni-
grams, bigrams, and emoji employed by these users. It is
clear from the Table that adult content users tend to employ
screen names with sexual connotations. We also investi-
gated which exact language is used in screen names. We
found that about 66% of these names consist of either Ara-
bic alphabet exclusively or a mixture of Arabic and Roman
alphabet. About 29% employ Roman alphabet only. The
rest 5% consists of emojis, numbers, symbols, or/and al-
phabet other than Arabic and Roman.
4.4. Tweet media
We also analyze the use of media in the tweets posted
by adult content spreaders. This helps us answer ques-
tions like: “What is the rate of tweets that contain URLs?”
and “Which is the most URL type (web page, photo or
videos) used?”. Table 7 summarizes the results of this
analysis. We have noticed that many of the adult con-
tent tweets contain links, many of which do not actu-
ally lead to what they are advertised to be, specifically
adult content (%59.68), but rather other sites but such
as news sites or ones related to health and beauty con-
tent (e.g., http://healthwabeauty.com/). Inter-
estingly, some links lead to blogs that do not seem to
originate from the Arab world. For example, the blog
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Type percentage Example English
Attribute 34% 	­J
 	J« Ém
	¯
Violent and potent
Attribute + city/country 9% 	AK
QË @ I. ËA Botton (in) Riyadh
Email address 2% a-sa**@**.com –
Emoji 19% –
Hashtag 1% ©£A®Ó# #clips
Person name 25% YËA 	g Khalid
Person name + attribute 5% HñK. ø
 Xñm.× Majoodi bisexual
Others 19% //-// –
Table 5: Types of screen names in a sample of 100 pornographic users
Uingram EN Bigram EN Emoji
º Sex hñJ 	®Ó * ¼ Open pus*y (unvirgin)
é®Ê¢Ó Divorced (F) èQ
J.» * ù
 £ Big As*
hñJ 	®Ó Open º ÐC 	¯ @ Sex movies
èPQjJÓ Emancipated (F) H. Q 	ªÖÏ @ 	áÓ From Morocco
ém.'
Aë Horny (F) ÐPAm× º Incest sex
éªËñÓ Horny (F) ú
G. Q« º Arab sex
Ém 	¯ potent (M) ú

	¯ º Sex in
* ù
 £ As* º ©£A
®Ó Sex clips
èQ
J.» Big (F) 	àñ 	¯ º Phone sex
ÐC 	¯ @ Movies h. @ð 	P ¡J
ð Marriage broker
Table 6: Top 10 unigram, bigram, and emojis in screen names used by users (F: female; M: male).
Count %
Web link URLs 6.754M 59.68%
URLs refer to photo 3.166M 27.98%
URLs refer to video 1.310M 11.57%
URLs refer to animated gif 86.973M 0.77%
Total URLs (web link+media) 11.318M 100%
Table 7: Types of media in tweet URLs in the data.
at https://ecoinsnews.blogspot.com/ focuses
on Bitcoin and the encryption market mostly likely directed
to English speaking-audience. We also observed that only
a small fraction of these sites are ones that solicit subscrip-
tions for one or another of a sex ‘service’ or sexual content.
4.5. Geographical Distribution
Using our dataset, we analyze the geographical distribution
of adult content across the Arab world. For the purpose, we
follow a simple method:
1. Initially, we automatically generate a list of
Arab countries and cities (we refer to the list
as autocities) from Google map API7. The
7https://developers.google.com/maps/?hl=
Country Freq. City Freq.
KSA 443, 112 Riyadh 89, 232
Egypt 202, 795 Jeddah 66, 944
Qatar 131, 707 Amman 27, 651
Iraq 81, 517 Makkah 16, 133
Kuwait 81, 517 Qassim 14, 344
Syria 76, 948 Dammam 14, 251
Lebanon 76, 290 Madinah 10, 365
Palestine 57, 029 Jerusalem 9, 345
Oman 55, 735 Tabuk 8,690
Bahrain 51, 956 Gaza 8, 256
Table 8: Top 10 Arab countries and cities matched in the
adult content.
autocities list pertains 22 countries and has a
total of 361 cities. autocities had several errors
(e.g., names in English and Hebrew, neighborhood
names instead of the a specific city name, GPS
coordinates cities).
2. For this reason, we manually correct this list using
the following procedure: For each country in the
autocities, we keep only Arabic city names and
fr.
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regular content adult content
BOW #data points acc avg-f prec rec f prec rec f
10 0.54 0.42 0.64 0.07 0.12 0.54 0.97 0.69
50 0.54 0.41 0.77 0.04 0.08 0.54 0.99 0.70
100 0.55 0.43 0.83 0.06 0.12 0.54 0.99 0.70
250 0.53 0.38 0.50 0.01 0.02 0.53 0.99 0.69
500 0.53 0.38 1.00 0.01 0.02 0.53 1.00 0.69
regular content adult content
BOM #data points acc avg-f prec rec f prec rec f
10 0.76 0.76 0.69 0.92 0.79 0.90 0.63 0.74
50 0.77 0.77 0.69 0.94 0.80 0.92 0.63 0.75
100 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.94 0.80 0.92 0.64 0.76
250 0.79 0.78 0.70 0.93 0.80 0.92 0.65 0.76
500 0.78 0.78 0.70 0.94 0.80 0.92 0.64 0.76
Table 9: Results from our models for detecting spreaders of adult content on Twitter. We use SVMs in our experiments.
BOW: bag-of-words models. BOF: bag-of-means models.
manually add other cities (replacing, e.g., the English
and Hebrew names with Arabic counterparts, and sub-
stituting GPS co-oridnates with corresponding cities).
For this step, we use Wikipedia8. We also search
Wikipedia for Arabic city names that are not in the
original autocities list and add cities we find. The
new list covers 22 countries and a total of 488 cities.
We call this list goldcities9.
3. Finally, we use goldcities to identify the names
of countries and cities targeted in the adult dataset,
based on simple matching between our goldcities and
tweets’ unigrams. This allows for identifying the most
targeted Arab countries and cities by adult content
users. Figure 1 maps the geographical distribution of
targets in adult content by country. Table 8 shows the
top 10 Arab countries as well as top 10 cities matched
in the data. The top two countries are KSA10 and
Egypt. The city list in Table 8 contains “Qassim”
which is a KSA province rather than a city. Observ-
ably, 7 cities out of the 10 top mentioned cities are
KSA cities. This shows very heavy targeting of KSA
cities. The findings about KSA and Egypt is not sur-
prising as these two countries have large Twitter pop-
ulations, although there may be other reasons these
countries are targeted most. Any such potential rea-
sons are outside the scope of our current work, but
form the basis of important research questions.
5. Classification
We build supervised models for detecting adult users ex-
ploiting the data of these users. For the purpose, we iden-
tify 2, 500 users in the adult data such that each has at least
500 tweets. For the negative class (i.e., regular users), we
use an equal number of users’ data where each user has at
least 500 tweets.
8https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Arab_
world.
9The goldcities list can be downloaded from: https:
//goo.gl/s3xzpB
10Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
5.1. Pre-processing, Data splits, and settings
We randomize the user data from both the positive and
the negative classes and remove all the hashtag seeds used
to collect the data. For this work, we choose our hyper-
parameters beforehand from a small set of choices as we
describe next. To facilitate replication and future work un-
der more sophisticated conditions, we split the data into
80% training, 10% development, and 10 % testing so that
development data can be used to tune parameters with more
advanced experiments. We employ simple SVM classifiers
with a fixed vocabulary size of 20K words, under two clas-
sification conditions:
Bag-of-Words: Where each vector simply represents each
word existing in a tweets with a binary value (0 or 1).
Bag-of-Means: We build a word embedding model
(Mikolov et al., 2013) exploiting a large in-house dataset
of Arabic tweets totaling > 100m data points. For this
purpose, we adopt the pre-processing pipeline of (Zahran
et al., 2015; Abdul-Mageed et al., 2018), in that we re-
move any non-unicode characters, normalize Alif maksura
to Ya, reduce all hamzated Alif to plain Alif, remove all
non-Arabic characters. To clean noise, we reduce all letter
repetition of> 2 characters to only 2. We build a skip-gram
model with 300 dimensions, a minimal word count = 100
words, and a window size of 5 words on each side of a tar-
get word. For vectorization, we average the word vectors
of each tweet, acquiring a 300-dimension bag of means for
each data point.
Settings: We develop the classifiers under a number of
conditions, pertaining the number of tweets exploited from
each user. We use numbers of tweets according to values
from the set {10, 50, 100, 250, 500}. For these simple clas-
sifiers, we use the scikit learn 11 SVC implementa-
tion.
5.2. Evaluation:
We report in terms of accuracy (acc), precision (prec), recall
(rec), and F-score (f). We use a random baseline of 50%,
which is also equal to each of the two classes in the data,
11http://scikit-learn.org/stable.
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given that the two classes are balanced. We first performed
the experiments on both Dev and Test under the same con-
ditions, but only report on Test here. As mentioned earlier,
we choose to set aside a development set for future repli-
cability and comparisons under more sophisticated experi-
mental conditions.
Table9 presents the results of our model. As the Table
shows, the BOM conditions perform better, with best ac-
curacy reaching 79% with 250 tweets, significantly (i.e.,
p< 0.03) exceeding the random baseline of 50%. The best
BOM (250 tweets) classifier reaches 92% of precision on
the adult/positive class, with a reasonable recall of 65%.
These results show the utility of the simple SVM BOM
classifier on this task, as opposed to a BOW. Even with 10
tweets, the BOM classifier performs at 76% acc, reaching
a high precision of 90% on the adult users class.
6. Conclusion
In this work, we described a method for collecting a large-
scale dataset of adult content in Arabic Twitter. We also
described the data we acquired using this method and used
the data to understand the tweeting behavior in this safety-
important area of online behavior. We also extracted three
lexica involving hashtags, unigrams, and bigrams, which
we also make available to the community. Analyzing our
data also gave us an opportunity to identify the geographi-
cal distribution of targets of adult content, which may lead
to future important discoveries about the dynamics and
market of adult content production and spread. We finally
developed simple, yet quite successful, models for detect-
ing spreaders of adult contents on the microblogging plat-
form. Our models achieve 79% accuracy on the task. In the
future, we plan to improve our classification models and
further investigate the network structure of the adult con-
tent spreaders.
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Abstract
With an increasing number of malicious attacks, the number of people and organizations falling prey to social engineering attacks
is proliferating. Despite considerable research in mitigation systems, attackers continually improve their modus operandi by using
sophisticated machine learning, natural language processing techniques with an intent to launch successful targeted attacks aimed at
deceiving detection mechanisms as well as the victims. We propose a system for advanced email masquerading attacks using Natural
Language Generation (NLG) techniques. Using legitimate as well as an influx of varying malicious content, the proposed deep learning
system generates fake emails with malicious content, customized depending on the attacker’s intent. The system leverages Recurrent
Neural Networks (RNNs) for automated text generation. We also focus on the performance of the generated emails in defeating
statistical detectors, and compare and analyze the emails using a proposed baseline.
Keywords: natural language generation, email masquerading, deep learning
1. Introduction
The continuous adversarial growth and learning has been
one of the major challenges in the field of Cybersecurity.
With the immense boom in usage and adaptation of the
Internet, staggering numbers of individuals and organiza-
tions have fallen prey to targeted attacks like phishing and
pharming. Such attacks result in digital identity theft caus-
ing personal and financial losses to unknowing victims.
Over the past decade, researchers have proposed a wide
variety of detection methods to counter such attacks (e.g.,
see (Verma and Hossain, 2013; Thakur and Verma, 2014;
Verma and Dyer, 2015; Verma and Rai, 2015; Verma and
Das, 2017), and references cited therein). However, wrong-
doers have exploited cyber resources to launch newer and
sophisticated attacks to evade machine and human super-
vision. Detection systems and algorithms are commonly
trained on historical data and attack patterns. Innovative at-
tack vectors can trick these pre-trained detection and clas-
sification techniques and cause harm to the victims.
Email is a common attack vector used by phishers that can
be embedded with poisonous links to malicious websites,
malign attachments like malware executables, etc (Drake
et al., 2004). Anti-Phishing Working Group (APWG) has
identified a total of 121,860 unique phishing email reports
in March 2017. In 2016, APWG received over 1,313,771
unique phishing complaints. According to sources in IRS
Return Integrity Compliance Services, around 870 organi-
zations had received W-2 based phishing scams in the first
quarter of 2017, which has increased significantly from 100
organizations in 2016. And the phishing scenario keeps
getting worse as attackers use more intelligent and sophis-
ticated ways of scamming victims.
Fraudulent emails targeted towards the victim may be con-
structed using a variety of techniques fine-tuned to create
the perfect deception. While manually fine-tuning such
emails guarantees a higher probability of a successful at-
tack, it requires a considerable amount of time. Phishers
are always looking for automated means for launching fast
and effective attack vectors. Some of these techniques in-
clude bulk mailing or spamming, including action words
and links in a phishing email, etc. But these can be easily
classified as positive warnings owing to improved statistical
detection models.
Email masquerading is also a popular cyberattack tech-
nique where a phisher or scammer after gaining access to
an individual’s email inbox or outbox can study the na-
ture/content of the emails sent or received by the target.
He can then synthesize targeted malicious emails masquer-
aded as a benign email by incorporating features observed
in the target’s emails. The chances of such an attack being
detected by an automated pre-trained classifier is reduced.
The malicious email remain undetected, thereby increasing
the chances of a successful attack.
Current Natural Language Generation (NLG) techniques
have allowed researchers to generate natural language text
based on a given context. Highly sophisticated and trained
NLG systems can involve text generation based on prede-
fined grammar like the Dada Engine (Baki et al., 2017) or
leverage deep learning neural networks like RNN (Yao et
al., 2017) for generating text. Such an approach essentially
facilitates the machine to learn a model that emulates the in-
put to the system. The system can then be made to generate
text that closely resembles the input structure and form.
Such NLG systems can therefore become dangerous tools
in the hands of phishers. Advanced deep learning neural
networks (DNNs) can be effectively used to generate co-
herent sequences of text when trained on suitable textual
content. Researchers have used such systems for generat-
ing textual content across a wide variety of genres - from
tweets (Sidhaye and Cheung, 2015) to poetry (Ghazvinine-
jad et al., 2016). Thus we can assume it is not long before
phishers and spammers can use email datasets - legitimate
and malicious - in conjunction with DNNs to generate de-
ceptive malicious emails. By masquerading the properties
of a legitimate email, such carefully crafted emails can de-
ceive pre-trained email detectors, thus making people and
organizations vulnerable to phishing scams.
In this paper, we address the new class of attacks based on
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automated fake email generation. We start off by demon-
strating the practical usage of DNNs for fake email gener-
ation and walk through a process of fine-tuning the system,
varying a set of parameters that control the content and in-
tent of the text. The key contributions of this paper are:
1. A study of the feasibility and effectiveness of deep
learning techniques in email generation.
2. Demonstration of an automated system for generation
of ‘fake’ targeted emails with a malicious intent.
3. Fine-tuning synthetic email content depending on
training data - intent and content parameter tuning.
4. Comparison with a baseline - synthetic emails gener-
ated by Dada engine (Baki et al., 2017).
5. Detection of synthetic emails using a statistical detec-
tor and investigation of effectiveness in tricking an ex-
isting spam email classifier (built using SVM).
2. Related Works
Phishing detection is one of the widely researched areas of
cybersecurity. Despite the development of a large number
of phishing detection tools, many victims are still falling
prey to these attacks. Researchers in (Drake et al., 2004)
explicitly break down the structure of a phishing email, de-
scribing in detail the modus operandi of a phisher or scam-
mer. In this section, we review previous research in areas of
text generation using natural language and the use of deep
learning in generation of phishing based attacks and detec-
tion.
Textual Content Generation. Natural language genera-
tion techniques have been widely popular for synthesizing
unique pieces of textual content. NLG techniques proposed
by (Reiter and Dale, 2000; Turner et al., 2010) rely on
templates pre-constructed for specific purposes. The fake
email generation system in (Baki et al., 2017) uses a set
of manually constructed rules to pre-define the structure of
the fake emails. Recent advancements in deep learning net-
works have paved the pathway for generating creative as
well as objective textual content with the right amount of
text data for training. RNN-based language models have
been widely used to generate a wide range of genres like
poetry (Ghazvininejad et al., 2016; Xie et al., 2017), fake
reviews (Yao et al., 2017), tweets (Sidhaye and Cheung,
2015), geographical information (Turner et al., 2010) and
many more.
The system used for synthesizing emails in this work is
somewhat aligned along the lines of the methodology de-
scribed in (Chen and Rudnicky, 2014a; Chen and Rud-
nicky, 2014b). However, our proposed system has no man-
ual labor involved and with some level of post processing
has been shown to deceive an automated supervised classi-
fication system.
Phishing email Detection. In this paper, we focus primar-
ily on generation of fake emails specifically engineered for
phishing and scamming victims. Additionally, we also look
at some state-of-the-art phishing email detection systems.
Researchers in (Basnet et al., 2008) extract a large number
of text body, URL and HTML features from emails, which
are then fed into supervised (SVMs, Neural Networks) as
well as unsupervised (K-Means clustering) algorithms for
the final verdict on the email nature. The system proposed
in (Chandrasekaran et al., 2006) extracts 25 stylistic and
structural features from emails, which are given to a super-
vised SVM for analysis of email nature. Newer techniques
for phishing email detection based on textual content anal-
ysis have been proposed in (Verma et al., 2012; Verma and
Hossain, 2013; Verma and Aassal, 2017; Yu et al., 2009).
Masquerade attacks are generated by the system proposed
in (Baki et al., 2017), which tunes the generated emails
based on legitimate content and style of a famous personal-
ity. Moreover, this technique can be exploited by phishers
for launching email masquerade attacks, therefore making
such a system extremely dangerous.
3. Experimental Methodology
The section has been divided into four subsections. We de-
scribe the nature and source of the training and evaluation
data in Section 3.1. The pre-processing steps are demon-
strated in Section 3.2. The system setup and experimental
settings have been described in Section 3.3.
3.1. Data description
To best emulate a benign email, a text generator must learn
the text representation in actual legitimate emails. There-
fore, it is necessary to incorporate benign emails in training
the model. However, as a successful attacker, our main aim
is to create the perfect deceptive email - one which despite
having malign components like poisoned links or attach-
ments, looks legitimate enough to bypass statistical detec-
tors and human supervision.
Primarily, for the reasons stated above, we have used mul-
tiple email datasets, belonging to both legitimate and ma-
licious classes, for training the system model and also in
the quantitative evaluation and comparison steps. For our
training model, we use a larger ratio of malicious emails
compared to legitimate data (approximate ratio of benign
to malicious is 1:4).
Legitimate dataset. We use three sets of legitimate emails
for modeling our legitimate content. The legitimate emails
were primarily extracted from the outbox and inbox of real
individuals. Thus the text contains a lot of named entities
belonging to PERSON, LOC and ORGANIZATION types.
The emails have been extracted from three different sources
stated below:
• 48 emails sent by Sarah Palin (Source 1) and 55 from
Hillary Clinton (Source 2) obtained from the archives
released in (The New York Times, 2011; WikiLeaks,
2016) respectively.
• 500 emails from the Sent items folder of the employ-
ees from the Enron email corpus (Source 3) (Enron
Corpus, 2015).
Malicious dataset. The malicious dataset was difficult to
acquire. We used two malicious sources of data mentioned
below:
• 197 Phishing emails collected by the second author -
called Verma phish below.
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• 3392 Phishing emails from Jose Nazario’s Phishing
corpus 1 (Source 2)
Evaluation dataset. We compared our system’s output
against a small set of automatically generated emails pro-
vided by the authors of (Baki et al., 2017). The provided
set consists of 12 emails automatically generated using the
Dada Engine and manually generated grammar rules. The
set consists of 6 emails masquerading as Hillary Clinton
emails and 6 emails masquerading as emails from Sarah
Palin.
Tables 1 and 2 describe some statistical details about the
legitimate and malicious datasets used in this system. We
define length (L) as the number of words in the body of an
email. We define Vocabulary (V ) as the number of unique
words in an email.
Dataset Count Avg. L Avg. V
Clinton 48 32 21
Palin 55 33 26
Enron 500 91 53
Total 603 81 48
Table 1: Legitimate Data Statistics
Dataset Count Avg. L Avg. V
Verma Phish 197 153 99
Nazario Phish 3392 210 129
Total 3589 207 127
Table 2: Phishing Data Statistics
A few observations from the datasets above: the malicious
content is relatively more verbose than than the legitimate
counterparts. Moreover, the size of the malicious data is
comparatively higher compared to the legitimate content.
3.2. Data Filtering and Preprocessing
We considered some important steps for preprocessing the
important textual content in the data. Below are the com-
mon preprocessing steps applied to the data:
• Removal of special characters like @, #, $, % as well
as common punctuations from the email body.
• emails usually have other URLs or email IDs. These
can pollute and confuse the learning model as to what
are the more important words in the text. Therefore,
we replaced the URLs and the email addresses with
the <LINK> and <EID> tags respectively.
• Replacement of named entities with the <NET> tag.
We use Python NLTK NER for identification of the
named entities.
On close inspection of the training data, we found that the
phishing emails had incoherent HTML content which can
pollute the training model. Therefore, from the original
1http://monkey.org/˜jose/wiki/doku.php
(2004), Deprecated now
data (in Table 2), we carefully filter out the emails that were
not in English, and the ones that had all the text data was
embedded in HTML. These emails usually had a lot of ran-
dom character strings - thus the learning model could be
polluted with such random text. Only the phishing emails
in our datasets had such issues. Table 3 gives the details
about the filtered phishing dataset.
Dataset Count Avg. L Avg. V
Verma Phish 127 50 34
Nazario Phish 2148 115 71
Total 2275 112 70
Table 3: Phishing Data Statistics after filtering step
3.3. Experimental Setup
We use a deep learning framework for the Natural Lan-
guage Generation model. The system used for learning
the email model is developed using Tensorflow 1.3.0 and
Python 3.5. This section provides a background on a Re-
current Neural Network for text generation.
Deep Neural Networks are complex models for computa-
tion with deeply connected networks of neurons to solve
complicated machine learning tasks. Recurrent Neural Net-
works (RNNs) are a type of deep learning networks better
suited for sequential data. RNNs can be used to learn char-
acter and word sequences from natural language text (used
for training). The RNN system used in this paper is ca-
pable of generating text by varying levels of granularity,
i.e. at the character level or word level. For our training
and evaluation, we make use of Word-based RNNs since
previous text generation systems (Xie et al., 2017), (Hen-
derson et al., 2014) have generated coherent and readable
content using word-level models. A comparison between
Character-based and Word-based LSTMs in (Xie et al.,
2017) proved that for a sample of generated text sequence,
word level models have lower perplexity than character
level deep learners. This is because the character-based
text generators suffer from spelling errors and incoherent
text fragments.
3.3.1. RNN architecture
Traditional language models like N-grams are limited by
the history or the sequence of the textual content that these
models are able to look back upon while training. However,
RNNs are able to retain the long term information provided
by some text sequence, making it work as a “memory”-
based model. However while building a model, RNNs are
not the best performers when it comes to preserving long
term dependencies. For this reason we use Long Short
Term Memory architectures (LSTM) networks which are
able to learn a better language/text representation for longer
sequences of text.
We experiment with a few combinations for the hyper-
parameters- number of RNN nodes, number of layers,
epochs and time steps were chosen empirically. The in-
put text content needs to be fed into our RNN in the form
of word embeddings. The system was built using 2 hid-
den LSTM layers and each LSTM cell has 512 nodes. The
input data is split into mini batches of 10 and trained for
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100 epochs with a learning rate of 2× 10−3. The sequence
length was selected as 20. We use cross − entropy or
softmax optimization technique (Goodfellow et al., 2016)
to compute the training loss, Adam optimization tech-
nique (Kingma and Ba, 2014) is used for updating weights.
The system was trained on an Amazon Web Services EC2
Deep Learning instance using an Nvidia Tesla K80 GPU.
The training takes about 4 hours.
3.3.2. Text Generation and Sampling
The trained model is used to generate the email body based
on the nature of the input. We varied the sampling tech-
nique of generating the new characters for the text genera-
tion.
Generation phase. Feeding a word (ŵ0) into the trained
LSTM network model, will output the word most likely to
occur after ŵ0 as ŵ1 depending on P (ŵ1 | ŵ0). If we want
to generate a text body of n words, we feed ŵ1 to the RNN
model and get the next word by evaluating P (ŵ2 | ŵ0, ŵ1).
This is done repeatedly to generate a text sequence with n
words: ŵ0, ŵ1, ŵ2, ..., ŵn.
Sampling parameters. We vary our sampling parameters
to generate the email body samples. For our implementa-
tion, we choose temperature as the best parameter. Given a
sequence of words for training, w0, w1, w2, ..., wn, the goal
of the trained LSTM network is to predict the best set of
words that follow the training sequence as the output (ŵ0,
ŵ1, ŵ2, ..., ŵn).
Based on the input set of words, the model builds a proba-
bility distribution P (wt+1 | wt′≤t) = softmax(ŵt), here
softmax normalization with temperature control (Temp)
is defined as:
P (softmax(ŵjt )) =
K(ŵjt ,Temp)∑n
j=1
K(ŵjt ,Temp)
, where
K(ŵjt , T emp) = e
ŵ
j
t
Temp
The novelty or eccentricity of the RNN text generative
model can be evaluated by varying the Temperature pa-
rameter between 0 < Temp. ≤ 1.0 to generate samples
of text (the maximum value is 1.0). We vary the nature
of the model’s predictions using two main mechanisms -
deterministic and stochastic. Lower values of Temp. gen-
erates relatively deterministic samples while higher values
can make the process more stochastic. Both the mecha-
nisms suffer from issues, deterministic samples can suffer
from repetitive text while the samples generated using the
stochastic mechanism are prone to spelling mistakes, gram-
matical errors, nonsensical words. We generate our samples
by varying the temperature values to 0.2, 0.5, 0.7 and 1.0.
For our evaluation and detection experiments, we randomly
select 25 system generated samples, 2 samples generated at
a temperature of 0.2, 10 samples at temperature 0.5, 5 sam-
ples at a temperature of 0.7 and 8 samples at temperature
1.0.
3.3.3. Customization of Malicious Intent
One important aspect of malicious emails is their harmful
intent. The perfect attack vector will have malicious ele-
ments like a poisonous link or malware attachment wrapped
in legitimate context, something which is sly enough to fool
both a state-of-the-art email classifier as well as the vic-
tim. One novelty of this system training is the procedure of
injecting malicious intent during training and generating
malicious content in the synthetic emails.
We followed a percentage based influx of malicious content
into the training model along with the legitimate emails.
The training models were built by varying the percentage
(5%, 10%, 30% and 50%) of phishing emails selected from
the entire phishing dataset along with the entire legitimate
emails dataset. We trained separate RNN models on all
these configurations. For studying the varying content in
emails, we generate samples using temperature values at
0.2, 0.5, 0.7 and 1.0.
3.4. Detection using Existing Algorithms
We perform a simple quantitative evaluation by using
three text-based classification algorithms on our gener-
ated emails. Using the Python SciKit-Learn library, we
test three popular text-based filtering algorithms - Sup-
port Vector Machines (Maldonado and L’Huillier, 2013),
Naive Bayes (Witten et al., 2016) and Logistic Regres-
sion (Franklin, 2005).
The training set was modeled as a document-term matrix
and the word count vector is used as the feature for build-
ing the models. For our evaluation, we train models using
Support Vector Machines (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB) and
Logistic Regression (LR) models on a training data of 300
legitimate emails from WikiLeaks archives2 and 150 phish-
ing emails from Cornell PhishBowl (IT@Cornell, 2018).
We test the data on 100 legitimate emails from WikiLeaks
archives that were not included in the training set and 25
‘fake’ emails that were generated by our natural language
generation model.
4. Analysis and Results
We discuss the results of the generative RNN model in this
section. We give examples of the email text generated with
various training models and varying temperatures. We also
provide the accuracy of the trained classifiers on a subset
of these generated email bodies (after slight post process-
ing). We try to provide a qualitative as well as a quantitative
review of the generated emails.
4.1. Examples of Machine generated emails
(A) Training only on Legitimates and varying sampling
temperatures
We show examples of emails generated using models
trained on legitimate emails and sampled using a tempera-
ture of 1.0.
Example I at Temperature = 1.0:
Dear <NME> The article in the <NME> offers promo-
tion should be somewhat changed for the next two weeks.
<NME> See your presentation today. <NME>
2https://wikileaks.org/
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Example II Example I at Temperature = 0.7:
Sir I will really see if they were more comments tomor-
row and review and act upon this evening <NET>. The
engineer I can add there some <LINK> there are the is-
sues <NET>. Could you give me a basis for the call him
he said
The example above shows that while small substrings make
some sense. The sequence of text fragments generated
make very little sense when read as a whole. When com-
paring these with the phishing email structure described in
(Drake et al., 2004), the generated emails have very little
malicious content. The red text marks the incongruous text
pieces that do not make sense.
(B) Training on Legitimates + 5% Malicious content:
In the first step of intent injection, we generate emails by
providing the model with all the legitimate emails and 5%
of the cleaned phishing emails data (Table 3). Thus for this
model, we create the input data with 603 legitimate emails
and 114 randomly selected phishing emails. We show as
examples two samples generated using temperature values
equal to 0.5 and 0.7.
Example I at Temperature = 0.5:
Sir Here are the above info on a waste of anyone, but an
additional figure and it goes to <NET>. Do I <NET>
got the opportunity for a possible position between our
Saturday <NME> or <NET> going to look over you in
a presentation you will even need <NET> to drop off the
phone.
Example II at Temperature = 0.7:
Hi owners <NET> your Private <NET> email from
<NET> at<NET> email<NET> Information I’ll know
our pending your fake check to eol thanks <NET> and
would be In maintenance in a long online demand
The model thus consists of benign and malicious emails in
an approximate ratio of 5:1. Some intent and urgency can
be seen in the email context. But the incongruent words
still remain.
(C) Training on Legitimates + 30% Malicious content:
We further improve upon the model proposed in (B). In this
training step, we feed our text generator all the legitimate
emails (603 benign) coupled with 30% of the malicious
emails data (683 malicious). This is an almost balanced
dataset of benign and phishing emails. The following
examples demonstrate the variation in text content in the
generated emails.
Example I at Temperature = 0.5:
Sir we account access will do so may not the emails about
the <NET> This <NET> is included at 3 days while
when to <NET> because link below to update your ac-
count until the deadline we will received this information
that we will know that your <NET> account information
needs
Example II at Temperature = 1.0:
Dear registered secur= online, number: hearing from This
trade guarded please account go to pay it. To modify your
Account then fill in necessary from your notification pref-
erences, please PayPal account provided with the integrity
of information on the Alerts tab.
A good amount of text seems to align with the features
of malicious emails described in (Drake et al., 2004)
have malicious intent in it. We choose two examples to
demonstrate the nature of text in the generated emails. We
include examples from further evaluation of steps.
(D) Training on Legitimates + 50% Malicious content:
In this training step, we consider a total of 50% of the
malicious data (1140 phishing emails) and 603 legitimate
emails. This is done to observe whether training on an
unbalanced data, with twice the ratio of malign instances
than legitimate ones, can successfully incorporate obvious
malicious flags like poisonous links, attachments, etc.
We show two examples of emails generated using deep
learners at varying sampling temperatures.
Example I at Temperature = 0.7:
If you are still online. genuine information in the mes-
sage, notice your account has been frozen to your account
in order to restore your account as click on CONTINUE
Payment Contact <LINK> UK.
Example IT at Temperature = 0.5:
Hi will have temporarily information your account will be
restricted during that the Internet accounts and upgrading
password An data Thank you for your our security of your
Account Please click on it using the <NET> server This
is an new offer miles with us as a qualified and move in
The generated text reflects malicious features like URL
links and tone of urgency. We can assume that the model
picks up important cues of malign behavior. The model
then learns to incorporate such cues into the sampled data
during training phase.
4.2. Evaluation using Detection Algorithm
We train text classification models using Support Vector
Machines (SVM), Naive Bayes (NB) and Logistic Regres-
sion (LR) models on a training data of 300 legitimate emails
from WikiLeaks archives3 and 150 phishing emails from
Cornell PhishBowl (IT@Cornell, 2018). We test the data
on 100 legitimate emails from WikiLeaks archives that
were not included in the training set and 25 ‘fake’ emails
that were generated by our natural language generation
model trained on a mix of legitimate and 50% malicious
emails. We randomly select the emails (the distribution is:
2 samples generated at a temperature of 0.2, 10 samples at
temperature 0.5, 5 samples at a temperature of 0.7 and 8
samples at temperature 1.0) for our evaluation.
We use the Scikit-Learn Python library to generate the
document-term matrix and the word count vector from a
given sample of email text body used as a feature for train-
3https://wikileaks.org/
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ing the classification models. The Table 4 reports the ac-
curacy, precision, recall, and F1-scores on the test dataset
using SVM, Naive Bayes and Logistic Regression classi-
fiers.
Classifier Accuracy Precision Recall F1-score
SVM 71 72 85 78
NB 78 91 75 82
LR 91 93 95 94
Table 4: Classification metrics of generated emails
Despite the incoherent nature of the generated emails, the
text-based classifiers do not achieve a 100% accuracy as
well as F1-scores.
4.3. Comparison of emails with another NLG
model
The authors in (Baki et al., 2017) discuss using a Recursive
Transition Network for generating fake emails similar in
nature to legitimate emails. The paper discusses a user
study testing the efficacy of these fake emails and their
effectiveness in being used for deceiving people. The
authors use only legitimate emails to train their model and
generate emails similar to their training data - termed as
‘fake’ emails. In this section, we compare a couple of
examples selected randomly from the emails generated by
the Dada Engine used in (Baki et al., 2017) and the outputs
of our Deep Learning system generated emails.
Generated by the RNN (Example I):
Hi will have temporarily information your account will be
restricted during that the Internet accounts and upgrading
password An data Thank you for your our security of
your Account Please click on it using the < NET >
server This is an new offer miles with us as a qualified
and move in
Generated by the RNN (Example II):
Sir Kindly limit, it [IMAGE] Please contact us contained
on this suspension will not be = interrupted by 10 product,
or this temporary cost some of the
Generated by the Dada Engine:
Great job on the op-ed! Are you going to submit? Also,
Who will be attending?
The examples provide evidence that emails generated by
the RNN are more on the lines of phishing emails than the
emails generated by the Dada Engine. Of course, the goal
of the email generated by the Dada engine is masquerade,
not phishing. Because of the rule-based method employed
that uses complete sentences, the emails generated by the
Dada engine have fewer problems of coherence and gram-
maticality.
5. Error Analysis
We review two types of errors observed in the evaluation
of our RNN text generation models developed in this study.
First, the text generated by multiple RNN models suffer
from repetitive tags and words. The example of the email
body below demonstrates an incoherent and absurd piece
of text generated by the RNN trained on legitimate emails
and 50% of phishing emails with a temperature of 0.5.
Hi 48 PDX Cantrell <LINK> <NET> <NET> ECT
ECT<NET><NET> ECT ECT<NET><NET> ECT
ECT <NET> <NET> ECT ECT <NET> F <NET>
ECT ECT <NET> G Slaughter 06 07 03 57 DEVEL-
OPMENT 06 09 2000 07 01 <NET> <NET> ECT EN-
RON 09 06 03 10 23 PM To <NET> <NET> ECT ECT
cc <NET> <NET> ECT ECT Subject Wow Do not un-
derestimate the employment group contains Socal study
about recession impact <NET> will note else to you for
a revised Good credit period I just want to bring the after-
noon <NET> I spoke to <NET> Let me know if
This kind of repetitive text generation was observed a num-
ber of times. However, we have not yet investigated the
reasons for these repetitions. This could be an inherent
problem of the LSTM model, or it could be because of the
relatively small training dataset we have used. A third is-
sue could be the temperature setting. More experiments are
needed to determine the actual causes.
The second aspect of error analysis is to look at the
misclassification by the statistical detection algorithms.
Here we look at a small sample of emails that were marked
as legitimate despite being fake in nature. We try to
investigate the factors in the example sample that can
explain the misclassification errors by the algorithms.
Example (A):
Hi GHT location<EID> Inc Dear<NET> Password Lo-
cation <NET> of <NET> program We have been riding
to meet In a of your personal program or other browser
buyer buyer The email does not commit to a secure F
or security before You may read a inconvenience during
Thank you <NET>
Example (B):
Sir we account access will do so may not the emails about
the <NET> This <NET> is included at 3 days while
when to <NET> because the link below to update your
account until the deadline we will received this informa-
tion that we will know that your <NET> account infor-
mation needs
Example (C):
Sir This is an verificati=<LINK>messaging center, have
to inform you that we are conducting more software, Re-
garding Your Password : <LINK>& June 20, 2009 Web-
mail Please Click Here to Confirm
Examples (A), (B) and (C) are emails generated from a
model trained on legitimate and 50% of phishing data (Type
(D) in Section 4.1.) using a temperature of 0.7. There can
be quite a few reasons for the misclassification - almost all
the above emails despite being ‘fake’ in nature have consid-
erable overlap with words common to the legitimate text.
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Moreover, Example (A) has lesser magnitude of indication
of malicious intent. And the amount of malicious intent in
Example (B), although notable to the human eye, is enough
to fool a simple text-based email classification algorithm.
Example (C) has multiple link tags implying possible ma-
licious intent or presence of poisonous links. However, the
position of these links play an important role in deceiving
the classifier. A majority of phishing emails have links at
the end of the text body or after some action words like
click, look, here, confirm etc. In this case, the links have
been placed at arbitrary locations inside the text sequence
- thereby making it harder to detect. These misclassifica-
tion or errors on part of the classifier can be eliminated by
human intervention or by designing a more sensitive and
sophisticated detection algorithm.
6. Conclusions and Future Work
While the RNN model generated text which had ‘some’
malicious intent in them - the examples shown above are
just a few steps from being coherent and congruous. We de-
signed an RNN based text generation system for generating
targeted attack emails which is a challenging task in itself
and a novel approach to the best of our knowledge. The ex-
amples generated however suffer from random strings and
grammatical errors. We identify a few areas of improve-
ment for the proposed system - reduction of repetitive con-
tent as well as inclusion of more legitimate and phishing ex-
amples for analysis and model training. We would also like
to experiment with addition of topics and tags like ‘bank ac-
count’, ‘paypal’, ‘password renewal’, etc. which may help
generate more specific emails. It would be interesting to
see how a generative RNN handles topic based email gen-
eration problem.
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